The protein system
The region runs two distinct food systems. Central America produces, on a maize and bean base: 4.15 million tonnes of maize in 2023, dry beans at 84 per cent self-sufficiency, eggs at 98 per cent, and a protein self-sufficiency ratio of 60 per cent.[1][4] The Caribbean purchases: 50 per cent self-sufficiency across the larger islands, 18 per cent across the seven smallest states, and six members at a cereal import dependency ratio of 100 per cent.[1][2]
Consumption is not deprived on average. Protein supply runs from 45.9 grams per person per day in Haiti to 115.4 in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, against a world figure of 92.5.[2] What the average hides is where the calories come from. Feed-intensive products supply 35.6 per cent of regional protein and fish only 3.3 per cent,[1] and 60 per cent of the region's maize supply is fed to livestock with two thirds of that maize imported.[1] The animal protein industry is, in substance, imported grain converted into chicken inside the region.
Payment for the imported half comes from outside the food system entirely. Food imports equal 661 per cent of Antigua and Barbuda's merchandise exports and 149 per cent of Haiti's.[2] The islands buy protein out of tourism receipts, the mainland out of remittances running at 30.1 per cent of GDP in Honduras.[8] Neither earning is a food asset, and both are controlled elsewhere.
Durable domestic capacity: 44
Quantitative score 50, adjusted down 6 points
The quantitative position is mid-range globally and far above the Gulf, but the base is eroding precisely where the land sits. Cuba holds 26 per cent of the region's arable land and the largest holding per person, and its rice output fell from 461,000 tonnes in 2018 to 84,000 in 2024, pigmeat from 236,000 to 17,000 tonnes.[4] Costa Rican rice output fell 64 per cent and Honduran 61 per cent over the same period.[4] In Haiti, armed-group control of the Artibonite has removed the state's ability to protect production while 52 per cent of the analysed population sits in IPC Phase 3 or worse in the March to June 2026 projection update, with more than 1.8 million of them in Phase 4.[21][22] We deducted six points for that documented deterioration and for active conflict degrading nominal capacity.
Two findings cap the pillar further. Caribbean dietary energy supply sits at 101 per cent of requirement, so the subregion carries no calorie buffer, and undernourishment there is 16.7 per cent against a world figure of 8.1.[2] Fisheries offer little relief: 41 per cent of assessed stocks in FAO Area 31 are overfished,[40] and Caribbean landings are 93,000 tonnes with aquaculture at 20,000 tonnes, for 39.9 million people.[7]
Resource headroom: 45
Quantitative score 47, adjusted down 2 points
This is the region's least bad pillar and its most unequally distributed. Mainland Central America holds some of the most water-abundant farmland on earth, with renewable internal freshwater of 37,891 cubic metres per person per year in Belize and 23,209 in Nicaragua.[9] The islands hold the opposite: 283 cubic metres in Barbados and 560 in Antigua and Barbuda,[9] and of ten English-speaking Caribbean small island states only four are classed as water secure above the 1,700 cubic metre threshold, with Grenada and Saint Lucia sitting on it.[42] That land and water base is backed by a genuinely functioning credit channel in the same members: FAOSTAT's agriculture orientation index for credit, where parity with agriculture's GDP share reads 1.00, stands at 1.22 in Panama, 0.84 in Belize, 0.75 in Costa Rica and 0.72 in Nicaragua, against 0.05 or below across the Eastern Caribbean small islands and no computable series at all for Cuba, the Bahamas or Haiti.[63]
Cuban official land-use statistics put only 43 per cent of the country's agricultural area under cultivation in 2017, leaving 57 per cent of roughly 6.3 million hectares idle, with no tenure category above 56 per cent utilisation,[48] but that idle land cannot be credited as latent headroom: Cuba has no plausible path, capital, machinery or imported inputs, to bringing it into production. Fertiliser import value has fallen from US$75 million to US$43-44 million, herbicide imports are down 80 per cent, agricultural aviation has halted and nitrogen use is down to 5,000 tonnes,[5][17] while rice output has collapsed 82 per cent and pigmeat 93 per cent since 2018.[4] The idle land is unrealised potential rather than scored headroom. The rest of the region tests differently. Most members irrigate under 4 per cent of arable land, and the arable-land-weighted regional share has been essentially flat for two decades, 3.7 per cent in 2000-2002 to 3.6 per cent in 2021-2023,[2][6] so rainfall does not survive a canícula when almost nothing is irrigated. Cropland and arable land per person have fallen 25 to 31 per cent regionally since 2000 as population growth outran a roughly flat land base, and Nicaragua's own arable-land area, one of the four we credit for endowment, is down 21.6 per cent on the last available agricultural census.[6][11] What remains admissible on the adjustment is this downward pressure, net of the credit finding above: the headroom being used is taken from forest as cattle push into the agricultural frontier; CARICOM's flagship '25 by 2025' production programme delivered a real but partial 24 per cent gain against a target it missed and pushed to 2030;[27][28] FEWS NET recorded primera planting in the Dry Corridor delayed by up to 40 days in the 2025 season after prolonged dry spells[25] and names El Niño as the dominant driver of below-normal rainfall into January 2027;[23] and the canal authority has cut the Panama Canal neo-Panamax maximum draft three times in 2026, from 50.0 feet to 49.5 on 1 July, 49.0 on 24 July and 48.5 on 15 August.[55] Together these take the pillar from 47 to 45.
The coastal base is also degrading, with the University of South Florida's July 2025 outlook estimating 38 million tonnes of sargassum across the Atlantic, Caribbean and Gulf, the largest accumulation since satellite monitoring began in 2011.[43]
Import exposure: 36
Quantitative score 38, adjusted down 2 points
About 44 per cent of regional protein supply is imported, rising to roughly 82 per cent across the seven smallest island states.[1] Volume is not the worst of it. Supplier concentration is extreme and points one way: a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 9,061 on soybean meal with 95.1 per cent from the United States, 7,453 on chicken meat, 4,764 on maize and 4,722 on wheat.[3] Cuba imported 239,400 tonnes of American chicken meat in 2024 from the country that embargoes it,[3] and the Dominican Republic alone bought US$2.2 billion of American farm goods.[15]
We deducted two points because a Herfindahl index treats the concentrated supplier as a neutral commercial counterparty. The same country supplies 95 per cent of the soybean meal and controls the remittance flows financing it, the migration policy generating them and the tariff schedule the food arrives under; the 1 per cent excise on cash remittances effective 1 January 2026 shows willingness to use those levers,[37][38] as does the concentration of removal flights, 41 per cent of the United States total in March 2026 going to Guatemala and Honduras, against 45 per cent in February and about 31 per cent in April.[54][56]
The deduction is small because substitution has already been shown to work in practice. The region's food lanes carry no exposure to any maritime chokepoint, and the Panama Canal it hosts kept operating at 35 daily transits through the Hormuz crisis, up 5.2 per cent year on year.[46] Substitution is demonstrated: the Dominican Republic moved 75 per cent of its maize to Brazil, Guyanese rice supplies 52 to 97 per cent of Eastern Caribbean requirements, and Central America sources 26.7 per cent of its agri-food imports regionally, though the Caribbean manages only 9.2 per cent.[3]
Upstream dependence: 29
Quantitative score 33, adjusted down 4 points
This is the binding constraint and the lowest pillar. Reporting members imported 2.05 million tonnes of soybean meal at 95.1 per cent single-supplier concentration and 8.56 million tonnes of maize, against domestic maize self-sufficiency of 36 per cent and wheat self-sufficiency of zero.[1][3] That structure is worse than importing the finished meat, because it commits domestic capital that is stranded the moment the feed stops.
On fertiliser the picture splits sharply and misleadingly. Trinidad and Tobago produced 647,000 tonnes of nitrogen nutrient and exported 690,000 tonnes in 2024, the world's largest ammonia exporter with roughly 15 to 20 per cent of the ocean-traded market, making the region a net nitrogen exporter.[5][33] Central America produced no nitrogen, phosphate or potash at all, and the region imported 194,000 tonnes of phosphate and 332,000 tonnes of potash nutrient.[5] We deducted four points on three grounds the ratios cannot show: no CARICOM mechanism directs Trinidadian nitrogen to regional food production; the asset is eroding, with gas utilisation down from 3.5 to 2.4 billion cubic feet per day since 2015, ammonia exports down from 4.6 to 3.6 million tonnes since 2019, and replacement volume depending on the Dragon field, which lies wholly in Venezuelan waters and can be developed only under a United States Treasury licence already granted, revoked and reissued once;[34][57] and Cuba shows what upstream failure does here, with nitrogen use at 5,000 tonnes and rice output collapsing 82 per cent rather than degrading gracefully.[4][5][17]
The 2026 fertiliser shock landed directly on that exposure: the World Bank index rose more than 12 per cent in the first quarter, urea passed US$850 per tonne in April at 80 per cent above February, and the index is forecast to rise more than 30 per cent across the year.[35] Honduran fertiliser costs were already 6 to 18 per cent above the five-year average in January, depending on the formulation.[24] Genetics rest on two global primary breeders, though 33.3 million live birds traded in 2023 show real multiplication capacity in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala.[3]
Access and affordability: 48
Quantitative score 51, adjusted down 3 points
On the World Bank/FAO Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet series, we estimate that approximately 43 per cent of the region's population could not afford a healthy diet in 2023-2024, a population-weighted computation across the twelve members with country-level data, covering 79 per cent of the region's people.[59] The FAO regional statistics annex gives a broadly consistent cross-check at the subregional level, with 50 per cent unaffordable across the Caribbean in 2022;[41] FAO's own Mesoamerica figure of 26.3 per cent is not comparable, since that grouping includes Mexico's 128 million people at a much lower share, and our own weighting of the six Central American members with data, El Salvador being absent from the series, gives approximately 39 per cent.[41][59] The two members that diverge most are Haiti, at 87.9 per cent, the highest reading in the hemisphere, and Saint Lucia, at 7.4 per cent. Saint Lucia's low figure has little to do with domestic production, which is minimal; it reflects tourism-linked wages that keep imported food within reach.[59]
Undernourishment and stunting confirm that affordability failure is concentrated rather than diffuse. Undernourishment runs at 5.4 per cent in Central America against 16.7 in the Caribbean and 51.4 in Haiti,[2] while stunting is overwhelmingly a Guatemalan problem, at 44.6 to 46.5 per cent of children under five, the highest rate in the hemisphere, against 4.6 to 6.7 per cent in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.[2][47][60] Prices compound the gap: Caribbean food prices have risen a cumulative 55 to 60 per cent since 2018,[36] and Honduran white maize was 40 per cent above its year-earlier price in January 2026.[24] Physical access fails outright in Haiti, where armed-group control of the Artibonite blocks roads rather than merely raising prices,[21] and intermittently across the small islands, where hurricanes cut market access for weeks regardless of income.[12][18] We deduct three points because Cuba, whose documented foreign-exchange collapse makes its true unaffordability almost certainly higher than the regional average, is entirely absent from the underlying data.
Shock endurance: 39
Quantitative score 34, adjusted up 5 points
The region absorbs more physical shocks than any other entity in the index and holds almost nothing in store. Hurricane Melissa caused US$8.8 billion of physical damage in Jamaica in October 2025, 41 per cent of 2024 GDP,[12] with J$29.5 billion of agricultural loss across 41,390 hectares, more than 70,000 farmers and about 1.25 million animals.[13][14] Hurricane Beryl cost Grenada 16.5 per cent of 2023 GDP and destroyed 98 per cent of banana and plantain production in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.[18][19] Hurricanes Oscar and Rafael affected about 800,000 Cubans and collapsed Cuba's grid in late 2024.[20]
Against that, the largest strategic reserve we could document is roughly 45,000 quintals of beans held by Honduras's IHMA,[49] and Guatemala has no formal purchase-and-hold policy. The region entered 2026 stressed rather than rested: 3.2 million of 7.6 million people, 42 per cent, were food insecure across the English and Dutch-speaking Caribbean in June 2025 and unchanged on 2024, with 30 per cent skipping meals, 6 per cent going a full day without eating and 65 per cent spending savings to buy food.[26] The Caribbean faces the highest cost of a healthy diet of any subregion in Latin America and the Caribbean, itself the world's most expensive region, at 5.16 PPP dollars per person per day,[41] and fiscal capacity spans a thirteenfold range from Haiti to Panama.[10] Ordinary volatility already causes serious stress, which is the definition of the lowest band.
Crisis purchasing power is the one component of endurance that is not close to the floor. Reserve cover ranges from 7.4 months of imports in Guatemala and 6.8 in Haiti down to 2.0 in Panama and 2.1 in El Salvador,[61] and only those two members and Saint Lucia, of the eighteen with data, sit below the IMF's conventional three-month adequacy benchmark. Fiscal space is thinner: El Salvador carries central government debt of 107.3 per cent of GDP,[62] and no member in this assessment could be shown at source quality to hold a social-protection system able to scale benefits quickly in a crisis, a gap that is recorded rather than credited. That strength is not enough to lift the pillar on its own, before the five-point qualitative uplift below.
We credited five points for three funded, operating mechanisms. Remittances at 16 to 30 per cent of GDP across six members rose through COVID-19 and the 2022 price spike and kept growing into 2026 despite the new excise.[8][39] CCRIF's parametric cover delivered US$91.9 million to Jamaica within weeks of Melissa, faster than any sovereign borrowing.[32] And 2.18 million tonnes of regional cassava gives a calorie substitution route in the two countries where protein has failed.[4] The uplift stops short of the maximum because the largest buffer is under active policy pressure.
Trajectory
The direction is flat rather than improving. CARICOM's 25 by 2025 target to cut the regional food import bill by a quarter, against a baseline above US$6 billion, was missed and pushed to 2030,[27][28] though the region recorded roughly a 24 per cent increase in food production between 2022 and late 2024.[27] Three credible near-term movers exist: Guyana's Tacama savannah corn and soya programme, which cultivated 12,000 acres in 2024 against a stated target of 25,000 acres twice a year and is aimed at livestock feed self-sufficiency and regional supply, the one intervention addressing the actual binding constraint;[31][58] the CARICOM cargo ferry pilot using Trinidad and Tobago's Galleons Passage, which attacks the trade cost keeping Caribbean internal sourcing at 9.2 per cent;[3][30] and CARICOM's real-time monitoring dashboard across 11 states, which substitutes information for reserves the region does not hold.[29]
The 2026 environment works against all three. The energy and fertiliser shock transmitted quickly to a region importing nearly all its fuel,[36] the remittance excise erodes the main household buffer,[37] NOAA's below-normal hurricane outlook arrives with an El Niño that raises Dry Corridor drought and canal water risk instead,[44][46] and Caribbean shipping carries elevated war-risk premiums after the January 2026 operation in Venezuela.[50] The lever that matters most is a regional feed-grain supply with contracted offtake and a mechanism directing Trinidadian nitrogen into CARICOM agriculture. Parametric insurance reduces the cost of shocks; it does not change what the region depends on.
Country notes
Guatemala. Largest maize producer at 2.26 million tonnes yet importing 2.02 million;[3][4] its failure is nutritional, at 44.6 per cent stunting on the 2024 modelled estimate and 46.5 per cent measured in the 2014-2015 ENSMI,[2][47] with 2.0 to 2.49 million needing assistance in 2026.[23]
Honduras. Among the index's most concentrated profiles, at 99.7 per cent of maize and 100 per cent of soybean meal from one supplier in 2024;[3] the 2023-24 shrimp collapse removed a line that paid for food.[51]
El Salvador. Fifty per cent protein self-sufficiency and the most regionally integrated food economy in the index, at 45.5 per cent intraregional sourcing.[1][3]
Nicaragua. The strongest capacity position and only significant protein exporter, at 70 per cent self-sufficiency and 116,000 tonnes of beef exports, with the highest Central American undernourishment at 17.3 per cent.[1][2][3]
Costa Rica. Animal-protein self-sufficiency of 80 per cent on total protein self-sufficiency of 56 per cent, with maize production of 8,000 tonnes against 1.07 million imported.[1][3][4]
Panama. The most single-sourced member, at 99.8 per cent of maize from one supplier,[3] and host to the region's chokepoint, whose binding constraint is now hydrological: the 2023-24 drought cut daily transits from a pre-drought 34 to 36 down to 24,[45] and the neo-Panamax maximum draft fell in three steps in 2026 to 48.5 feet.[55][46]
Belize. On the indicators the most self-sufficient member, at 13.2 per cent cereal import dependency with the highest freshwater endowment;[2][9] its reported catch is open-registry attribution.[7]
Cuba. The most severe active failure and largest arable holding: rice down 82 per cent since 2018, nitrogen use at 5,000 tonnes, and 57 per cent of the agricultural area uncultivated on the most recent retrievable official position, for 2017,[4][5][48][53] with up to 37.8 per cent of the population below 2,100 calories.[17]
Dominican Republic. The best-performing large Caribbean member and the only one to diversify a major feed line, moving 75 per cent of maize to Brazil;[3] domestic maize covers under 5 per cent of use.[16]
Haiti. Severely constrained across every pillar: 45.9 grams of protein per person per day, 5.83 million in IPC Phase 3 or worse in the March to June 2026 projection update, 86.7 per cent food insecure.[2][21][22]
Jamaica. The clearest endurance test here, with US$8.8 billion of damage against a US$91.9 million payout;[12][32] chicken runs at 84 per cent self-sufficiency on imported grain.[3][52]
Trinidad and Tobago. The sharpest contradiction in the region: the world's largest ammonia exporter, with roughly 15 to 20 per cent of the ocean-traded market, on 100 per cent cereal import dependency and a declining gas feedstock.[1][2][33][34]
The Bahamas. The region's most supplier-concentrated food system at 85.5 per cent United States sourcing, on 15 per cent protein self-sufficiency.[1][2][3]
Barbados. The most water-scarce state in the index at 283 cubic metres per person, offset by the highest irrigation coverage at 12.6 per cent,[2][9] and the most institutionally active member.[30]
Saint Lucia. Sixteen per cent protein self-sufficiency on the region's lowest arable land per person, 0.015 hectares, with a single-supplier animal protein chain.[1][3][6]
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The highest protein supply in the region, 115.4 grams per person per day, on 7 per cent animal-protein self-sufficiency;[1][2] Beryl destroyed 98 per cent of banana production.[19]
Grenada. Beryl's worst-hit state at 16.5 per cent of GDP,[18] yet better diversified than most small islands and with the best Eastern Caribbean food-insecurity trend.[2][3]
Antigua and Barbuda. The weakest capacity position in the index at 6 per cent protein self-sufficiency, with food imports at 661 per cent of merchandise exports.[1][2][9]
Dominica. The least measured member, absent from the current Food Balance Sheets release altogether,[1] with the Caribbean's highest intraregional sourcing at 37.2 per cent.[3]
Saint Kitts and Nevis. The smallest member, at 3 per cent protein self-sufficiency, effectively zero for animal protein, under absolute water scarcity.[1][2][9]