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Central Asia & Caucasus

PSI score 59.6/100ExposedRank 22 of 43

Covers: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan

Summary

Central Asia & Caucasus grows more wheat and nitrogen fertiliser than it uses, but water is scarce across much of the region. The region produces about 80 per cent of its own protein.⁠[1] Its wheat surplus comes mostly from Kazakhstan; Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan buy much of their wheat from neighbours, often relying on a single supplier.⁠[4, 8, 31] Meat and milk production is also uneven, and several countries import much of the chicken they eat.⁠[1, 7, 10] A trade interruption would therefore be felt very differently across the eight members.

Water is the longer-term constraint on production. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan withdraw water equal to 123 and 135 per cent of their renewable resources respectively.⁠[5] Much of that water originates in the Kyrgyz and Tajik mountains before reaching farms downstream.⁠[20] Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa canal could add pressure to the shared Amu Darya as it is completed.⁠[24] Existing crops and livestock still provide a substantial food base, but the region has little spare water with which to expand it.

The protein system

Food supplies across the eight members provide about 103.5 grams of protein per person a day, weighted by population, with 48.5 grams from animal foods.⁠[2, 3] The range is wide. Uzbekistan has 111.4 grams and Tajikistan 83.1.⁠[2] The region produces about 80 per cent of its protein and 88 per cent of its animal protein, but the members contribute very unequally.⁠[1]

Kazakhstan grows the grain. In 2025/26 the eight members produced 29.57 million tonnes of wheat and used 27.55 million, and most of the surplus was in Kazakhstan.⁠[8, 11, 12] Armenia and Georgia import much of their wheat, and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also rely on Kazakh grain.⁠[4, 31] Livestock is more spread out. Uzbekistan produces much of the region's beef and milk, while Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia import poultry to fill gaps.⁠[1, 7, 10]

So the food system works across borders. Grain moves from the Kazakh steppe to its neighbours, and fertiliser and energy come from a few countries.⁠[6, 8, 20] These links keep food flowing in normal years. But they leave importers exposed to a poor Kazakh harvest, border closures and shrinking rivers.⁠[5, 11, 24, 31]

Durable domestic capacity:

Local farms supply about 80 per cent of the region's protein and 88 per cent of its animal protein.⁠[1] Self-sufficiency ranges from about 86 per cent in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to 44.9 per cent in Georgia. Turkmenistan's official production figures are not independently checked.⁠[1, 19] is below 2.5 per cent in five members and reaches 8 per cent in Tajikistan.⁠[4]

The clear gap is poultry. In 2022 Armenia produced 26 per cent of the chicken it ate, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia 33 per cent and Turkmenistan 40 per cent. Kazakhstan imported 141,000 of the 434,000 tonnes of chicken it ate in 2025/26.⁠[1, 10] The region has chosen to import chicken rather than grow more.

Farmland is wearing out in both wet and dry areas. Uzbekistan produces most of the region's milk and beef in a river basin that uses 123 per cent of its renewable water.⁠[5, 7] In Kazakhstan, soil fertility fell 17 per cent in twenty years, about 75 per cent of soil is thought to be degraded, and farmers use only 2.3 kg of nitrogen fertiliser per hectare.⁠[6, 11]

Resource headroom:

Water is what limits farming here. Weighted by population, the region uses about 81 per cent of its renewable water. Turkmenistan uses 135 per cent and Uzbekistan 123 per cent, more than their rivers and rain replace.⁠[5] Most of the water falls in the Kyrgyz and Tajik mountains, while most irrigated farming is downstream.⁠[20] About 30 per cent of arable land can be irrigated, a high share, but the irrigated area fell 4.0 per cent from 2000 to 2024.⁠[39]

Land per person is shrinking. The population grew 39.1 per cent between 2000 and 2024, while arable land and cropland barely changed, so both fell about 29 per cent per person.⁠[39, 20] Some members lost far more. Georgia's arable area fell about 65 per cent, and Kazakhstan's arable land per person fell 23.8 per cent.⁠[39, 20]

Water-saving irrigation now covers half of Uzbekistan's irrigated land, up from 4 per cent in 2020, and the next programme targets another 1.4 million hectares.⁠[41] Turkmenistan's Golden Age Lake, by contrast, is still unfilled after decades of work.⁠[42]

The 2026 season is testing the shared rivers. The Amu Darya flowed at 66.8 per cent of normal in February.⁠[21] Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa canal is built to take up to 10 km³ a year from the river, with full operation planned for 2028.⁠[24, 28] How much it actually takes will depend on how it is run.⁠[24, 25]

Import exposure:

The region exports more wheat than it imports. But the regional cereal import share of 15.2 per cent is low only because Kazakhstan exports so much.⁠[4, 8] Seven members have no coast, so every route to world markets crosses a neighbour or the small Caspian corridor. Grain avoids the major sea chokepoints, though soybean meal bought by Azerbaijan and Georgia passes through the Turkish Straits.⁠[31] The Middle Corridor carried 4.1 million tonnes across the Caspian in 2024, about 6 per cent of what the northern route through Russia can carry. The Caspian has dropped by up to 30 centimetres a year since 2020, cutting rail-ferry traffic by 22 per cent. Georgian ports are nearly full, and funding for the new Anaklia port fell from 150 to 50 million lari for 2026.⁠[23, 30, 33]

Without Kazakhstan, the region imports 34.6 per cent of its cereals. Armenia imports 75 per cent, Georgia 66 per cent and Tajikistan 48 per cent.⁠[4] Five members buy at least 90 per cent of their imported wheat from one supplier. Armenia, Kazakhstan and Georgia rely on Russia, and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on Kazakhstan.⁠[31] Kazakhstan's wheat crop is forecast to fall from 19.33 to 15 million tonnes in one season, and Russia restricts exports every two to three years.⁠[8, 11, 27] A poor Kazakh harvest can hit the whole region.

Upstream dependence:

The region makes 132 per cent of the nitrogen fertiliser it uses, 134 per cent of the potash and 91 per cent of the phosphate. Turkmen and Uzbek gas runs the nitrogen plants, Kazakhstan's Karatau deposits supply most phosphate, and potash comes from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.⁠[6] Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also export energy, and Uzbekistan roughly breaks even.⁠[20]

Most feed is home-grown. Cottonseed and other oilseed meals cover the region's needs, and soybean meal supplies about 22 per cent.⁠[9] Kazakh barley and Kyrgyz maize supply much of the feed grain.⁠[8] In March 2026 Kazakhstan restricted imports of Russian livestock and feed grain after a disease outbreak, but kept milling wheat flowing.⁠[11]

Five states produce the surplus all eight depend on, and a quarter of the region's people live outside it. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan make no nitrogen, phosphate or potash at all. Armenia also buys about 80 per cent of its gas from Russia, so one supplier controls both its fertiliser and the energy behind its food.⁠[6, 26] Georgia's Rustavi plant exports 150,740 of the 178,974 tonnes of nitrogen it makes, and runs on imported gas.⁠[6] The region also imports breeding stock, veterinary products and machinery.

Access and affordability:

The share of people who ranges from 0.7 per cent in Azerbaijan and 3.4 per cent in Kazakhstan to 22.1 per cent in Kyrgyzstan and 44 per cent in Armenia.⁠[34] Across five Central Asian members, it fell from 16.6 to 11.3 per cent between 2023 and 2025.⁠[34]

Undernourishment is below 2.5 per cent in five members and 8 per cent in Tajikistan. averages 7.1 per cent, higher in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.⁠[4] Prices are less stable. Food inflation averaged 8.2 per cent in 2025, and 14.3 per cent in Kazakhstan.⁠[36] Getting food to people is also hard. Armenia's grain comes through Russia or, since late 2025, by rail through Azerbaijan and Georgia. Mountain roads slow deliveries in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and Georgia's ports are nearly full.⁠[23, 26, 29] The World Bank names the import-dependent countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus as especially exposed when prices rise in the Middle East.⁠[38]

World price rises reached local markets despite the distance from the sea. In members whose currencies did not rise, local food prices went up on average by about 85 per cent as much as world prices. That ranged from 60 per cent in Tajikistan to 134 per cent in Azerbaijan.⁠[43, 44, 45, 46] Wheat flour rose 19.3 per cent in Kazakhstan and 23.8 per cent in Kyrgyzstan between 2021 and 2022, reflecting how closely Kazakh prices drive the region.⁠[47]

Stronger currencies cushioned Armenia and Georgia, whose currencies rose 13.5 and 9.5 per cent against the dollar. The tenge and the Uzbek som fell.⁠[45] Prices later rose across the region. By March 2026, all seven members with monthly data were at four-year highs, on average 38.3 per cent above March 2022, even though world food prices had fallen 19.7 per cent. In Kazakhstan the rise was 59.4 per cent.⁠[43, 44, 48]

In 2025, beef prices swung by more than 25 per cent in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while flour and bread barely moved.⁠[47] A day's minimum wage in Kazakhstan bought 1.6 kg of chicken or 12.3 kg of flour, but less than a kilogram of beef.⁠[47, 49] Tajikistan had the smallest rise in food prices over four years, 14.5 per cent.⁠[43, 47]

Shock endurance:

Grain stocks and livestock are the region's main buffers. Wheat stocks of 5.59 million tonnes, 3.00 million of them in Kazakhstan, cover 20.3 per cent of a year's use in 2025/26, about 74 days. That falls to 64 days on the 2026/27 forecast.⁠[8] The region's 70 million sheep and 31.5 million cattle are a living reserve, though drought takes the pasture first.⁠[7]

Poorer members that import food have less room to respond. Tajikistan's food imports cost 53 per cent of what it earns from exports, and money sent home by workers abroad equals 57.7 per cent of GDP.⁠[4, 20] Food insecurity affects 27.9 per cent of people in Tajikistan and 25.7 per cent in Georgia.⁠[4] Bread and flour prices in Georgia rose sharply in 2022 after its main supplier was disrupted.⁠[27]

Reserves cover 7.5 months of imports on average across seven members. Georgia and Armenia hold about three months.⁠[37] Among four members with data, government debt ranges from 20.9 per cent of GDP in Kazakhstan to 47.9 per cent in Armenia.⁠[37] Few members have large cash transfer systems ready for a crisis.⁠[37]

Kazakh railways already carry two thirds of its wheat exports to neighbouring countries, so sending more to them is a policy choice, not just a matter of logistics.⁠[11] Kazakhstan's state grain buyer supports the home market. Armenia has restricted wheat exports, and Azerbaijan and Georgia remove VAT to steady food prices.⁠[11, 16, 17, 18] Protein supply of 103.5 grams per person a day leaves a good margin above what people need.⁠[2]

Trajectory

Uzbekistan offers the clearest chance to save water. Water-saving irrigation grew from 4 to 50 per cent of its irrigated land between 2020 and 2025, and the next programme targets another 1.4 million hectares.⁠[22, 41] Smaller gains include more Georgian wheat, Armenia's new rail deliveries of wheat through Azerbaijan and Georgia, and a planned KazProtein plant to make starch and pea protein.⁠[7, 11] The Trans-Caspian route also carried a small shipment of Kazakh flour to the United States in 2026.⁠[29]

The near term is getting harder. Kazakhstan's wheat crop is forecast to fall by more than a fifth in 2026/27, to between 14 and 15 million tonnes on USDA's estimates.⁠[8] The Kazakh Grain Union has cut its estimate of feed flour exports to China, and both major rivers began the 2026 irrigation season below normal.⁠[11, 21, 22]

Country notes

Kazakhstan. The region's mainstay. It produces 86 per cent of its own protein, grew 19.33 million tonnes of wheat and exported 11.5 million tonnes in 2025/26, has 1.459 hectares of arable land per person and runs the region's only state grain buyer.⁠[1, 8, 11, 20] Its weaknesses are in the soil: farmers use 2.3 kg of nitrogen per hectare and soil fertility has fallen 17 per cent in twenty years. It imports a third of its chicken.⁠[6, 10, 11]

Uzbekistan. With 37.1 million people, 14.1 million cattle, 11.9 million tonnes of milk and 1.08 million tonnes of nitrogen fertiliser, it is the region's centre for people, livestock and fertiliser.⁠[6, 7, 20] It is also the biggest risk. It uses 123 per cent of its renewable water, and needs to import 4.2 million tonnes of wheat in 2026/27, mostly from Kazakhstan.⁠[5, 13]

Turkmenistan. It uses 135 per cent of its renewable water and has 194 cubic metres of its own freshwater per person, making it the most water-stressed state here. Its irrigation depends on the Karakum Canal, which draws from the river just below Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa canal.⁠[5, 20, 22] Gas powers 761,000 tonnes of nitrogen fertiliser output. It publishes less data than any other member, and FAO's country brief has not changed since October 2020.⁠[6, 19]

Kyrgyzstan. Rich in water upstream, at 7,015 cubic metres per person,⁠[20] but short of food. FAO lists it as a low-income food-deficit country.⁠[15] Imported wheat covers about half of food and milling needs,⁠[15] it produces 33 per cent of its chicken⁠[1] and it makes no fertiliser.⁠[6] It does grow 810,000 tonnes of maize⁠[8] and keeps 5.6 million sheep.⁠[7]

Tajikistan. The weakest member on most measures. It has the region's lowest protein supply, 83.1 grams per person a day.⁠[2, 3] Imported wheat covers more than half its cereal needs,⁠[14] and 27.9 per cent of people are food insecure.⁠[4] Money sent home by workers abroad equals 57.7 per cent of GDP.⁠[20] That pays for its food but leaves it exposed if jobs dry up in Russia.

Georgia. It produces 44.9 per cent of its own protein, the lowest share in the region, and is the only member with a coast. It grows about 23 per cent of its wheat and imported 550,000 tonnes in 2024, with Russia supplying 99.5 per cent of wheat and 96.4 per cent of flour.⁠[1, 16, 27, 31] Water is plentiful and land is not, at 0.082 hectares of arable land per person. Food insecurity, at 25.7 per cent, is the second highest in the region. Georgia lands the region's only large sea catch, 213,600 tonnes in 2023. Only 79,300 tonnes of that is from the Black Sea and Mediterranean. The other 134,300 tonnes is caught by its fleet off West Africa.⁠[4, 5, 20, 32]

Armenia. The member most reliant on one supplier. Russia supplied all its wheat imports in 2024 on FAO figures, and 99 per cent in 2025 on Armenian customs figures, along with 99 per cent of cooking oil and about 80 per cent of gas. Armenia grew 23.2 per cent of its own wheat in 2022.⁠[1, 4, 26, 31] Its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed, so grain arrives over the Upper Lars mountain crossing, which closes in bad weather, or by rail through Azerbaijan and Georgia. It makes no fertiliser, and it banned wheat and barley exports from June 2025 to July 2026.⁠[6, 17, 29]

Azerbaijan. It grows 1.9 million tonnes of wheat and uses 3.3 million, so it imports 34 per cent of its cereals. But food imports cost only 7 per cent of its export earnings, and wheat is free of VAT until January 2027. It imports grain but can afford to.⁠[4, 8, 18] It is the region's largest buyer of soybean meal, 180,000 tonnes on USDA figures,⁠[9] three quarters of it from Argentina.⁠[31] It exports all its nitrogen fertiliser.⁠[6] It uses 57.5 per cent of its renewable water,⁠[5] catches 63,000 tonnes of fish from a shrinking Caspian,⁠[23, 32] and 16.6 per cent of people are food insecure.⁠[4]

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  13. GIEWS Country Brief: Uzbekistan (reference date 14 July 2026), FAO (2026)
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  15. GIEWS Country Brief: Kyrgyzstan (reference date 5 May 2026), FAO (2026)
  16. GIEWS Country Brief: Georgia (reference date 15 April 2026), FAO (2026)
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  30. Kazakhstan Reports Caspian Sea Level Decline, Outlines 2050 Scenarios (10 March 2026; Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources and Kazhydromet data), The Astana Times (2026)
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  40. Investment: Credit to Agriculture, data (agriculture orientation index for credit), FAOSTAT (2026 (data 1991-2024))
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Data gaps

Turkmenistan's agricultural statistics have not been independently updated since 2020, and its true wheat position is the largest single uncertainty for the region. No diet-affordability data exists at all for Georgia or Turkmenistan; the regional unaffordability figure is a residual built from the other members, and Georgia's own weak food-security readings suggest its real share sits above that figure. FAO also reports no food-insecurity prevalence for Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, together 44 per cent of the region's population. FAOSTAT customs data show larger soybean-cake entries into Uzbekistan than the USDA balance; the difference may reflect onward rail transit to neighbouring countries.⁠[9, 31] Armenia's 2024 wheat-import share is from FAOSTAT trade data; Armenian customs put Russia's share at 99 per cent in 2025, with a reported value of USD 82 million.

About this assessment

2026 edition.

Written by Felix Collins and Alex Aldridge. Published by Full Circle Biotech.

Methodology reviewed by an independent expert panel.