The Protein Sovereignty Index

Country assessment

Chile

We assess Chile as Exposed (61.9). The country is one of the world's largest protein exporters, harvesting 1,169,218 tonnes of salmonids and recording 4,508,338 tonnes of combined landings and aquaculture harvest in 2025 against a population of 19.9 million.[3][10]

Almost nothing feeding that output originates in Chile, and that is the binding constraint. Argentina alone supplied 85.6 per cent of the 2.64 million tonnes of maize Chile imported in 2024, and Argentina and Paraguay together supplied 82.7 per cent of 1.08 million tonnes of soybean meal.[9] Projected maize stocks of 130,000 tonnes cover roughly fifteen days of consumption.[1]

A second, distributional constraint sits alongside the supply-chain one: 38.1 per cent of Chileans cannot afford a nutritionally adequate diet, even though undernourishment and child stunting are both close to zero.[36][38]

The protein system

Chile eats well and exports heavily. Per-capita protein supply was 105.1 grams per day in 2023, 54th of the 176 countries FAOSTAT reports and well above the world median of 92.7 grams, and the diet is broad: 37.9 kg of poultry, 31.4 kg of pork, 27.5 kg of beef and 14.4 kg of seafood a year.[4][5] Severe food insecurity affects 3.5 per cent of the population on the 2022 to 2024 three-year average.[8]

The system has three legs. Salmonid aquaculture is the largest by value, earning USD 6.549 billion in 2025, up 3 per cent, equal to 29 per cent of food export value, 15 per cent of non-mining exports and 6 per cent of all exports. SalmonChile ranks salmonids second among individual export products, behind copper.[16] On Kontali's figures Chile held 30.5 per cent of world farmed salmonid production behind Norway on 46.4 per cent, and its harvest grew 14 per cent.[16][17] Practically all of it sits in three southern regions, which on a 1,151,996-tonne regional base split Aysen 45.6 per cent, Los Lagos 41.2 per cent and Magallanes 13.1 per cent,[24] a split corroborated exactly by the 474,857 tonnes Sernapesca's fourth-quarter bulletin records for Los Lagos, which is 41.2 per cent of that base.[29]

The second leg is industrial pelagic fishing. FAO ranks Chile tenth in the world for capture fisheries at 2.1 million tonnes of aquatic animals in 2024 and first in Latin America for farmed aquatic animals at 1.4 million tonnes, with USD 8.5 billion of aquatic animal product exports, second in the region behind Ecuador.[27] Add the 427,966 tonnes of harvested algae and FishStat puts total capture at 2,527,787 tonnes.[7] Industrial landings of 1,267,257 tonnes in 2025 were 93 per cent pelagic, jack mackerel alone accounting for 1,077,666 tonnes, and artisanal landings added 1,715,681 tonnes, 58 per cent of it pelagic.[3]

The third leg is intensive terrestrial livestock. Pork production of 585,000 tonnes against consumption of 484,000 tonnes makes Chile a net exporter at 121 per cent self-sufficiency, and chicken production of 692,000 tonnes covered 97 per cent of a 714,000-tonne market in 2024.[2] Beef is the outlier, with domestic output supplying about 30 per cent of consumption and imports of 397,695 tonnes carcass-weight equivalent filling the rest.[2] Underneath sits a cereal sector in structural retreat: wheat area is projected to fall to 190,000 hectares and maize area to 45,000 hectares in MY2026/27, giving 1.15 million tonnes of wheat and 525,000 tonnes of maize against consumption of 2.46 and 3.13 million tonnes.[1]

Durable domestic capacity: 67

Quantitative score 72, adjusted down 5 points

On volume, Chile is comfortably self-sufficient and then some: aquatic production of roughly 4 million tonnes would meet the protein needs of 19.9 million people several times over, and pork and poultry are at or above domestic demand.[2][3][6][7][10]

Durability is where we mark Chile down. Capture fisheries fell 61 per cent from 4,738,165 tonnes in 2005 to a trough of 1,826,603 tonnes in 2016, and at 2,527,787 tonnes in 2024 remain 47 per cent below the 2005 level; strip out harvested algae and the fall to 2016 was steeper still at 65 per cent.[7] Subpesca's March 2026 report finds 6 of the 25 fisheries with updated status overexploited and 4 depleted, so two-fifths of that base is in poor condition, and on the wider count of all 28 fisheries reported the figure is 46 per cent.[19] Arable land is 1.89 per cent of the land area, leaving no route to substituting domestic grain at scale.[10]

We apply -5 because the aggregate ratio flatters a narrow system. Effectively the whole exportable surplus is one farming system in the fjords and archipelagos of three southern regions, and a single algal bloom in early 2016 removed around 12 per cent of annual salmon output in two weeks.[12] An eroding resource base and concentrated production geography are admissible grounds.

Resource headroom: 52

Quantitative score 46, adjusted up 6 points

Chile's protein mix is among the most feed-intensive in the world. All three legs convert purchased grain and oilseed meal: animal feed is roughly 90 per cent of maize use, wheat feed demand of 160,000 tonnes is tied largely to salmon rations in which wheat is about 15 per cent of the formulation, and USDA records feed as the primary production cost in pork, with output growth in pork and chicken coming from efficiency gains inside existing facilities.[1][2] On the marine side, salmonid farming draws on a resource that peaked globally decades ago: 87 per cent of world fishmeal and 74 per cent of world fish oil production go to aquaculture, and Atlantic salmon alone is credited with 60 per cent of fish oil usage in 2020, on a denominator the source leaves unstated.[15]

Terrestrial room is limited. National freshwater withdrawal is a modest 8.98 per cent of available resources, but that conceals a stressed agricultural heartland: basins from Santiago northward have sustained high water stress since the 1990s, the megadrought of 2010 to 2022 pushed semi-arid basins into high and extreme stress, groundwater extraction rose 383 per cent between 1997 and 2022, and withdrawals rather than recharge variability account for 65 per cent of the resulting water-table drawdown.[11][20][21] The land base itself has been shrinking rather than expanding. Arable land fell 22.5 per cent between 2000 and 2024, from 1.82 million to 1.41 million hectares, a decline of around 39 per cent per person once population growth is priced in, and cropland on the broader FAO definition that includes permanent crops fell 11.9 per cent over the same period, troughing at 1.72 million hectares in 2007 before a fruit- and vineyard-led recovery brought it back to 1.91 million hectares by 2024.[47] Irrigation-equipped area barely moved across that entire window, rising from 1.10 million to 1.11 million hectares, so the resulting jump in irrigation coverage from 60.5 to 78.6 per cent of arable land reflects a shrinking denominator rather than new investment: it is a mature, already-built stock, not a growth margin.[47] FAOSTAT carries no agriculture-specific credit series for Chile at all, only undifferentiated Total Credit, which is recorded as a finding rather than a blank, but the gap in the statistic is not a gap in the institution: INDAP's Siembra por Chile programme placed CLP 111.6 billion in agricultural credit in 2024 reaching more than 20,000 producers through BancoEstado, and the Ministry of Agriculture and BancoEstado stood up a FOGAPE-backed soft credit line for cereal growers within weeks of the 2022 fertiliser and water cost shock.[48][49][50]

We apply +6 on two grounds. First, the largest feed fishery Chile controls is in verified good order. SPRFMO's Scientific Committee put jack mackerel spawning stock biomass at around 17.7 million tonnes against a BMSY of 8.9 million tonnes in its 2024 assessment, with fishing mortality of 0.14 well below FMSY,[30] and its September 2025 reassessment records the stock above 100 per cent of BMSY and fishing mortality below FMSY for both 2024 and 2025.[31] The stock has been rebuilt since 2018 and not subject to overfishing since 2013, and MSC certification of the Chilean industrial purse seine fishery was confirmed unchanged in June 2024.[14] The 2026 catch limit of 1,531,071 tonnes allocates 1,105,484 tonnes to Chile, 66 per cent of the total.[32] Second, national land and water indicators are calibrated to terrestrial agriculture and understate a fjord system. Aysen and Magallanes are water-abundant and Magallanes carried about 13 per cent of 2025 output, so physical room exists where the protein is grown.[24] Neither ground rests on cropland or agricultural credit, which is why a contracting arable base and an absent FAOSTAT credit series confirm the limited terrestrial room already priced into the pillar's indicators rather than disturbing the adjustment.

Import exposure: 67

Quantitative score 62, adjusted up 5 points

Chile is a large net protein exporter facing negligible chokepoint risk and highly concentrated suppliers. Food made up 22.7 per cent of merchandise exports in 2025 against food imports of 11.6 per cent of merchandise imports, and fisheries and aquaculture earned USD 7,664.9 million in the ten months to October 2025.[10][18]

What Chile imports is bought from a very short list. Maize was 85.6 per cent Argentine and 10.1 per cent Paraguayan; soybean meal was 48.4 per cent Argentine, 34.3 per cent Paraguayan, 10.1 per cent Bolivian and 6.5 per cent Brazilian.[9][23] Beef imports were 48.2 per cent Paraguayan, 40.3 per cent Brazilian and 8.4 per cent Argentine, three suppliers at 97 per cent.[2] Dependence ratios are high: 79 per cent of maize supply, 53 per cent of wheat consumption, around 70 per cent of beef.[1][2] Wheat is the diversified line, split 38.2 per cent United States, 29.9 per cent Canada, 22.4 per cent Uruguay, 9.5 per cent Argentina.[9]

Geography is Chile's compensation. None of its protein-relevant imports transits Hormuz, Malacca, Suez or Bab el-Mandeb; Southern Cone feed and beef arrive overland across Andean passes or by short sea from the River Plate. Across maize, soybean meal and beef, between 98 and 100 per cent by commodity comes from the five neighbours Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.[9] We apply +5 because a single-year concentration statistic overstates the risk where substitution is demonstrated. Paraguayan maize shipments rose from 8,524 tonnes in March to December 2024 to 908,600 tonnes in the same months of 2025 while Argentine volumes fell 40 per cent, which is switching in practice within twelve months.[1] The residual risk is that Argentine and Paraguayan droughts and export-policy shifts correlate, so Southern Cone diversification is thinner than the partner count suggests.

Upstream dependence: 52

Quantitative score 47, adjusted up 5 points

Feed is the binding upstream dependency and for the terrestrial sector it is close to total. Around 79 per cent of maize supply is imported, soybean meal imports of 1,075,230 tonnes in 2024 sat against soybean imports of only 85,881 tonnes because Chile has no oilseed crush of scale, compound feed preparations added 302,290 tonnes, and USDA notes that price transmission from world markets is strong precisely because the imported share of supply is so high.[1][9]

Nitrogen and phosphate fertiliser are wholly purchased: 728,871 tonnes of nitrogenous product in 2024, of which 517,502 tonnes was urea, 277,077 tonnes of other compound fertiliser including 178,439 tonnes of MAP and 17,204 tonnes of DAP, and 66,271 tonnes of superphosphate, a combined 1.07 million tonnes, or 1.12 million with potash included.[9][28] Nitrogen is well spread across 37 partners, with Brunei at 23.1 per cent, the United States 20.9, Russia 13.9, Malaysia 12.4 and China 8.4.[9] Superphosphate is the concentrated line, 67.9 per cent Moroccan and 31.9 per cent Chinese, although it is the smallest of Chile's phosphate import lines.[9] Potash runs the other way: Chile exported 502,200 tonnes of potassic fertiliser and 418,977 tonnes of potassium nitrate in 2024 against imports of 50,898 tonnes, because SQM produces potash and nitrates from the Salar de Atacama and the northern nitrate fields.[9][28] FAOSTAT records no urea production for Chile in any year of its series, which brings ODEPA's 2012 finding that all Chilean urea is imported up to current data.[26][28]

Animal health is a further weakness. Sernapesca records 217.4 tonnes of antimicrobial active ingredient administered in Chilean salmon farming between January and June 2024, 98.36 per cent of it in the seawater phase, where 98.08 per cent was florfenicol and 97.96 per cent was directed at piscirickettsiosis, all of it on imported veterinary inputs, with the rise in seawater use attributed to low-oxygen events and harmful algal blooms in Los Lagos and Aysen in late 2023.[25][33] Sernapesca's annual 2024 report puts the antimicrobial consumption index for cycles closed in seawater at 302.33 grams per tonne harvested, against 18.92 grams per tonne for the 28.7 per cent of harvest tonnage certified under the PROA-Salmon programme.[34]

We apply +5 because Chile is a net exporter of the marine feed protein its own farms consume, shipping 252,945 tonnes of fishmeal in 2024 against 28,672 tonnes imported, and because domestic potash and nitrate output makes the fertiliser stack part-sovereign.[9] A feed-import ratio treats the whole input stack as purchased and misses a sovereign, operating and exportable marine ingredient base.

Access and affordability: 58

Quantitative score 58, no adjustment applied

Chile's outcome indicators and its distributional indicator point opposite ways. On the FAO/World Bank Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet series, 38.1 per cent of Chileans could not afford a nutritionally adequate diet in 2024, down from 42.5 per cent in 2022 and 50.1 per cent in 2017.[36][37] Scarcity does not explain it. Prevalence of undernourishment sits at 2.5 per cent, the FAO reporting floor, and child stunting at 1.8 per cent, both among the lowest levels recorded anywhere.[38][39] The population priced out of the reference diet basket is not visibly going hungry or stunted, and the gap is a cost-basket and income-distribution effect, with Chile's inequality leaving the bottom of the distribution unable to clear the basket's cost even as actual dietary outcomes hold up.

Price volatility has been severe in absolute terms. The food and non-alcoholic beverages CPI division rose 24.7 per cent over twelve months to December 2022, twice the 12.8 per cent overall index reading that month and the worst of the twelve divisions during Chile's sharpest inflation episode since 1991, before the overall index fell back to 3.5 per cent by December 2025, a swing of currency pass-through and withdrawn pandemic-era transfers rather than a persistent structural feature.[40][41] Physical access is generally strong, through supermarket chains and a national road network, but with specific documented gaps: Arica y Parinacota in the desert north and Magallanes y Antartica in Patagonia record no traditional street markets, and cold-chain and logistics gaps persist for small-scale and indigenous producers on the country's lower-quality farmland.[42][43]

We apply no adjustment, and the score sits where the unaffordability share puts it. A 38.1 per cent share puts the pillar at 58. Near-floor undernourishment and stunting recover part of that gap. The stunting reading is a 2014 observation with no later national survey,[38] and the December 2025 price reading uses the overall IPC because the food and non-alcoholic beverages division was not published in that release.[41] Weighting the pillar's five indicators as a straight mean would lift the score well above that share, because two of the three outcome checks are close to their best possible values. The affordability share governs the score: distribution beats the average, and crediting those outcomes a second time as an upward adjustment would count them twice. Chile's affordability statistic and its nutritional outcomes point in opposite directions, and the divergence is disclosed here rather than resolved by adjustment.

Shock endurance: 67

Quantitative score 65, adjusted up 2 points

Endurance rests on substitution and fiscal depth rather than reserves. Stock cover is thin: projected ending stocks of 180,000 tonnes of wheat and 130,000 tonnes of maize equate to roughly 27 and 15 days of consumption, and USDA records limited storage infrastructure with many producers relying on temporary silo bags.[1] We found no strategic food reserve disclosure for Chile.

Fiscal capacity is genuine, though the sovereign funds are thinner than the reserves position suggests. Reserves stood at USD 49.4 billion in 2025 and GDP per capita at USD 17,995.[10] Two funds created under the 2006 Fiscal Responsibility Law, the FEES and the FRP, give the Treasury a countercyclical buffer,[22] but the FEES held only USD 3,912.75 million at the end of January 2026, cumulative withdrawals since 2007 having slightly exceeded cumulative contributions of USD 27,763.41 million.[35] Chile can outbid on world grain markets, and its dietary breadth means no single commodity failure empties the plate.[5]

Crisis purchasing power is Chile's strongest endurance component and the main reason the score sits above what stock ratios alone would suggest. Reserves of USD 49.4 billion cover around 5.5 months of the USD 108.7 billion of goods and services Chile imported in 2025, comfortably above the conventional three-month adequacy threshold.[10][44] Both major agencies affirmed Chile's sovereign rating with a stable outlook on 27 October 2025, S&P at A and Moody's at A2, with S&P projecting net general government debt to stabilise around 37 per cent of GDP through 2028 and Moody's expecting Chile to stay below the 45 per cent prudent threshold, which keeps market access open on favourable terms.[45] Social protection can scale fast: the Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia 2.0 reached 3,229,838 households, 8,068,158 people, or roughly 41 per cent of the population, by its fifth and sixth payments in September 2020, within seven months of Chile's first confirmed case.[46] Chile can outbid on world grain markets and can put cash into a large share of households quickly; neither capacity shows up in a stock-to-use ratio.

The shock record cuts both ways. The 2016 Pseudochattonella bloom killed around 12 per cent of annual salmon production, destroying over 40,000 tonnes of biomass and more than USD 800 million of value; the Global Aquaculture Alliance's industry account puts the tonnage higher, at 39 million salmon and 100,000 tonnes harvest weight, for the same USD 800 million.[12][13] A subsequent Alexandrium catenella bloom hit Chiloe and its coastal facilities, and the resulting loss of income sparked three weeks of social protest.[13] The earlier ISA epizootic cut aquaculture output from 881,084 tonnes in 2009 to 713,241 tonnes in 2010.[6] Chile also sits on one of the world's most seismically active continental margins, and its salmon industry occupies the fjord system most exposed to it.

We apply +2 for demonstrated recovery and for a buffer no stock ratio captures; thin grain stocks and near-total feed import dependence bound how far wealth and reserves substitute for physical buffers. Aquaculture output exceeded one million tonnes by 2012, three years after the ISA trough, and the sector reached export earnings of USD 6.549 billion in 2025, up 3 per cent.[6][16] More fundamentally, Chile exports roughly 1.09 million tonnes of seafood products and 200,163 tonnes of pork a year while its population eats only 14.4 kg of seafood per head.[5][9] That export stream is a protein reserve held in live inventory, and redirecting a fraction of it would cover national needs many times over. Together the purchasing-power component and the adjustment take this pillar from 65 to a final 67.

Trajectory

Three levers matter most for Chile from here. The first is feed diversification. Any credible domestic route to feed protein, through insect meal, single-cell protein, algal oils or expanded pulse and canola area, attacks the weakest pillar directly; today the pork and poultry sector, worth 69 kg per person per year of the diet, runs on a grain flow one neighbour controls.[5] The second is aquaculture siting and biosecurity: continued good management of the jack mackerel stock protects the marine ingredient base, while concentration in Los Lagos and Aysen keeps a 2016-scale bloom or a Magellanic seismic event as a live single-point risk.[24][31][33] The third is storage. Fifteen days of maize cover and no disclosed strategic reserve is the cheapest fixable weakness in the assessment.[1]

The direction of travel is favourable on production and flat on resilience. Salmon harvests grew 14 per cent in 2025 and total landings and harvest rose 13 per cent, the megadrought has eased enough for USDA to record improved water availability lifting yields, and the jack mackerel stock remains above BMSY on SPRFMO's most recent assessment.[1][3][16][24][31] None of that changes the fact that Chile has built one of the hemisphere's most productive protein systems on a supply chain it does not own.

Sources

  1. Grain and Feed Annual, Santiago, Chile (CI2026-0003), 25 March 2026 · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2026)
  2. Chilean Meat Market Outlook (CI2025-0019), 29 August 2025 · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2025)
  3. Sernapesca publica estadistica oficial de pesca y acuicultura del ano 2025 · Servicio Nacional de Pesca y Acuicultura (Sernapesca) (2026)
  4. Food Balance Sheets, Chile, protein supply quantity (element 674), data · FAOSTAT (2025 (data 2023))
  5. Food Balance Sheets, Chile, food supply quantity kg/capita/year by item (element 645), data · FAOSTAT (2025 (data 2023))
  6. Global Production 2026.1.0, Chile aquaculture quantity by species and source · FAO FishStat (2026 (data 2024))
  7. Global Production 2026.1.0, Chile capture quantity by species and area · FAO FishStat (2026 (data 2024))
  8. Food Security Indicators, Chile, prevalence of severe food insecurity in the total population (item 210401, three-year average) · FAOSTAT (2026 (data 2022-2024))
  9. Comtrade database, Chile as reporter (HS 1001, 1005, 1201, 230120, 2304, 2309, 3102-3105, 0203, 0302-0304, 051191) · United Nations Statistics Division (2026 (data 2024))
  10. World Development Indicators, Chile (AG.LND.ARBL.ZS, SP.POP.TOTL, NY.GDP.PCAP.CD, FI.RES.TOTL.CD, TX.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN, TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN) · World Bank (2026)
  11. Level of water stress: freshwater withdrawal as a proportion of available freshwater resources, Chile (ER.H2O.FWST.ZS) · World Bank / FAO AQUASTAT (2025 (data 2022))
  12. Hydroclimatic conditions trigger record harmful algal bloom in western Patagonia (summer 2016) · Scientific Reports (Nature) (2018)
  13. Harmful Algal Blooms: assessing Chile's historic HAB events of 2016 · Global Aquaculture Alliance (2017)
  14. Whole Fish Fishery Assessment: Jack Mackerel (Trachurus murphyi), FAO 87, Chilean EEZ Regions XV-X · MarinTrust / LRQA (2025)
  15. A review of the global use of fishmeal and fish oil and the Fish In:Fish Out metric · Science Advances (2024)
  16. Salmon chileno se consolida como el segundo producto mas exportado del pais durante 2025 (analysis of Banco Central de Chile trade data) · SalmonChile A.G. (2026)
  17. Salmonids made up 29% of Chile's food export earnings last year (SalmonChile export bulletin; global production shares from Kontali) · Fish Farming Expert / Salmonexpert (2026)
  18. Informe Sectorial de Pesca y Acuicultura: produccion pesquera y acuicola de 2025 superan promedios historicos · Ministerio de Economia, Fomento y Turismo (Chile) (2026)
  19. Estado de situacion de las principales pesquerias chilenas, ano 2025 (Departamento de Pesquerias, March 2026) · Subsecretaria de Pesca y Acuicultura (Subpesca) (2026)
  20. Increasing water stress in Chile revealed by novel datasets of water availability, land use and water use, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 29, 5185, doi:10.5194/hess-29-5185-2025 · Hydrology and Earth System Sciences (Copernicus), peer-reviewed (2025)
  21. The catastrophic effects of groundwater intensive exploitation and megadrought on aquifers in Central Chile · Science of the Total Environment (Elsevier) (2024)
  22. Fondos soberanos: Fondo de Estabilizacion Economica y Social and Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones · Ministerio de Hacienda de Chile (2026)
  23. Detailed Trade Matrix, Chile as reporter (maize, wheat, soya beans, cake of soya beans, bovine and pig meat), data · FAOSTAT (2025 (data 2024))
  24. Anuario Estadistico de Sernapesca: desembarques y acuicultura crecieron 13% en 2025 · AQUA (reporting Sernapesca) (2026)
  25. Sernapesca publica el Informe de Uso de Antimicrobianos y Antiparasitarios en la Salmonicultura del primer semestre del 2024 · Servicio Nacional de Pesca y Acuicultura (Sernapesca) (2025)
  26. La urea y su comercializacion en Chile · ODEPA (Oficina de Estudios y Politicas Agrarias, Chile) (2012)
  27. Latin America and the Caribbean records USD 21 billion in aquatic animal trade surplus (SOFIA/SOFI regional briefing, Chile rankings; launched 16 June 2026) · FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (2026 (data 2024))
  28. Fertilizers by Product, Chile (urea, MOP, SOP, potassium nitrate, MAP, DAP, superphosphates: import, export, production and agricultural use) · FAOSTAT (2026 (data 2024))
  29. La salmonicultura concentro el 58% de las cosechas acuicolas de Los Lagos en 2025 (Sernapesca fourth-quarter 2025 sectoral bulletin) · Salmonexpert (2026)
  30. 12th Meeting of the Scientific Committee, meeting report (15 November 2024), jack mackerel assessment, paragraph 113 · South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) (2024)
  31. 13th Meeting of the Scientific Committee, meeting report adopted 13 September 2025, jack mackerel advice and stock status table · South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) (2025)
  32. Conservation and Management Measure CMM 01-2026 for Trachurus murphyi, paragraph 6 and Tables 1 and 2 · South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) (2026)
  33. Informe de Farmacos Salmonicultura Nacional, primer semestre 2024 (antimicrobial and antiparasitic use in salmon farming) · Servicio Nacional de Pesca y Acuicultura (Sernapesca) (2025 (data first half 2024))
  34. Sernapesca presenta informes anuales de estado sanitario y uso de farmacos en la acuicultura (annual 2024 reports, published 17 July 2025) · Servicio Nacional de Pesca y Acuicultura (Sernapesca) (2025 (data 2024))
  35. Fondo de Estabilizacion Economica y Social, Informe Ejecutivo Mensual a Enero de 2026 · Ministerio de Hacienda de Chile / Direccion de Presupuestos (DIPRES) (2026)
  36. Share of population that cannot afford a healthy diet (Chile), derived series based on FAO/World Bank Food Prices for Nutrition CoAHD data · Our World in Data (2025 (data 2017-2024))
  37. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024, cost and affordability of a healthy diet, regional statistics for Latin America and the Caribbean · FAO / World Bank / UNICEF / WFP / WHO (2024 (data 2022))
  38. World Development Indicators, Chile, prevalence of undernourishment (SN.ITK.DEFC.ZS) and prevalence of stunting, height for age (SH.STA.STNT.ZS) · World Bank, sourced from FAO SOFI and UNICEF/WHO/World Bank JME (2026)
  39. Chile country nutrition profile, child stunting, wasting and overweight prevalence · Global Nutrition Report (2022 (data referenced to UNICEF/WHO/World Bank JME expanded database))
  40. Boletin Indice de Precios al Consumidor (IPC), diciembre 2022 · Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE), Chile (2023 (data December 2022))
  41. Indice de Precios al Consumidor (IPC) de diciembre presento una variacion mensual de -0,2% · Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE), Chile (2026 (data December 2025))
  42. Public policies and the food system in Chile, in Public Policies and Food Systems in Latin America · NCBI Bookshelf (National Center for Biotechnology Information) (2023)
  43. Elderly Walking Access to Street Markets in Chile: An Asset for Food Security in an Unequal Country · Sustainability (MDPI), peer-reviewed (2023)
  44. World Development Indicators, Chile, imports of goods and services, current US$ (NE.IMP.GNFS.CD) · World Bank (2026 (data 2025))
  45. S&P and Moody's Ratings Agencies Affirm Chile's Sovereign Ratings with a Stable Outlook, at A and A2, Respectively · Ministerio de Hacienda de Chile, citing S&P Global Ratings and Moody's Ratings (2025)
  46. Emergency Family Income 2.0 for Covid-19 (IFE 2.0, Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia 2.0 por Covid-19) · CEPAL / Alianza del Pacifico, Observatory of Social Development (2020)
  47. Inputs: Land Use, Chile (Arable land, Cropland, Land area equipped for irrigation, Agriculture area actually irrigated), data · FAOSTAT (2026 (data 1961-2024))
  48. Investment: Credit to Agriculture, Chile, data · FAOSTAT (2026 (data checked 2001-2024))
  49. Programa Siembra por Chile 2024 dispone de $131 mil millones iniciales para fortalecer la agricultura · Ministerio de Agricultura de Chile (2024)
  50. Ministerio de Agricultura y BancoEstado acuerdan credito blando de hasta 5 mil UF para insumos de agricultores cerealeros y que se ampliara a otros rubros · ODEPA / Ministerio de Agricultura de Chile (2022)

What we could not measure

Chile's most recent measure of child stunting dates to 2014, since the country does not run frequent national nutrition surveys. Diet affordability points the other way: 38.1 per cent of Chileans could not afford a healthy diet in 2024, even as undernourishment and stunting sit near zero. No disclosure of Chile's strategic grain reserves was found, so the endurance reading treats the country as holding only commercial stocks.

Published August 2026 ·How scores are produced