The protein system
Diets and farming differ sharply across the region, but every country is short of land and water. In several of the most populous, war, sanctions or currency collapse have also hit food production and what households can afford.
Iran, Iraq and Yemen hold 75.7 per cent of the region's people, and Iran and Iraq together more than half.[8, 11] Iran accounts for about 43 per cent of the region's protein supply, Iraq 18 per cent and Yemen 11 per cent.[8, 11]
Protein supply ranges from 130.7 grams per person per day in Israel to 45.0 in Yemen. Iran and Lebanon each supply 79.6 grams, Iraq 74.5, Jordan 71.1 and Syria 70.6, against a world average of 92.5.[8] Yemen's supply fell 20 per cent, from 56.1 grams in 2021 to 45.0 in 2023.[8]
Harvests differ just as much. Iran harvested 19.5 million tonnes of cereals in 2025 and still imported around 22 million tonnes, about 30 per cent more than its five-year average.[1] At the other end, Syria produced 1.2 million tonnes,[3] Yemen about 400,000 tonnes against a need of 5.2 million,[4] and Lebanon 90,000 tonnes.[5] Israel grew 60,000 tonnes of wheat against consumption of 2.3 million tonnes,[6] and Jordan 30,000 against 1.065 million.[7] Poultry, eggs and dairy supply most animal protein, largely from imported grain.
Durable domestic capacity:
A few members still produce food on a large scale, but output is falling across most of the region.
Iran and Iraq both farm at scale. Iran produced 12 million tonnes of wheat and 3.9 million tonnes of rice in 2025,[1] and its fisheries and fish farms produce 2.71 million tonnes, on official figures.[26] Iraq's government buys wheat at more than double the world price,[32] and it says domestic wheat has met demand for three to four seasons.[27, 28] Israel is different again. It produces 99 per cent of its poultry and about 2 billion eggs a year under quota, but imports 90 per cent of its grain.[23, 6]
Output is much lower elsewhere. Syria grew 0.9 to 1.1 million tonnes of wheat in 2025, leaving a shortfall of 2.73 million tonnes, after rainfall came in more than 50 per cent below average.[3, 16] About 75 per cent of Gaza's former cropland is destroyed or damaged.[30] Jordan grows less than 3 per cent of the wheat it eats.[7]
Further losses are already under way. FAO warns that Iranian farmers may struggle to get inputs for the coming season,[1] and the fertiliser shortage falls while winter wheat is growing, which will cut the 2027 harvest.[18] Iraq's claim of self-sufficiency was made while its water reserves fell to under 4 billion cubic metres by the end of 2025.[28]
Resource headroom:
There is little land or water to expand farming. Seven members have less than 1,000 cubic metres of internal renewable water per person a year, and five less than 500, the level of absolute scarcity. Yemen has 55 cubic metres, Jordan 61, Israel 80, Palestine 165, Syria 318, Iraq 799, Lebanon 836 and Iran 1,435. Arable land ranges from 0.008 hectares per person in Palestine to 0.186 in Syria.[9, 10]
Iran has little left to expand into. Farming takes 92 per cent of the water drawn, only about a third of irrigation water reaches crops, and salt affects between half and three-quarters of irrigated land, costing USD 1–1.8 billion a year. Twelve of 31 provinces are projected to run their aquifers dry within fifty years.[25]
Iraq has only 799 cubic metres of internal freshwater per person, and most of the water it uses arrives in rivers from Turkey and Iran. Baghdad controls neither. Its stored water fell from about 60 billion cubic metres in 2020 to under 4 billion by the end of 2025, and the agriculture ministry halved the area of river-irrigated wheat.[28] A wet winter then lifted storage back to about 34 billion cubic metres in 2026.[33] For a country with 19.6 per cent of the region's people, water supply is neither secure nor predictable.
Irrigation has grown only a little across the region, from 46.7 per cent of cropland in 2000 to 50.9 per cent in 2024.[47] In Iraq, farm lending relative to farming's share of the economy more than halved, and the irrigated share of cropland fell from 78 to 65 per cent even as cropland grew 20 per cent.[48] Arable land per person fell 36.3 per cent from 2000 to 2024, as the population grew 61.3 per cent and arable land only 2.7 per cent. Palestine and Yemen saw the steepest falls.[47, 49]
Israel has irrigation but no spare water. It grows no feed maize because of water limits.[6] Its irrigated area fell from 218,000 to 179,000 hectares after 2018, against 306,000 hectares equipped.[47]
Import exposure:
Every member imports more food than it exports, and two weak points were both under attack in 2026: reliance on the Black Sea, and reliance on narrow sea routes.
Much of the region's grain comes from Russia and the Black Sea. Russia alone supplies 70 to 80 per cent of Israel's wheat.[6] Jordan buys from Romania, Bulgaria and Russia,[7] and Iran's extra wheat comes from Russia.[1] Israel and Jordan both want to buy from more countries, but cheap freight from the Black Sea keeps winning out.[6, 7]
Imports depend on chokepoints. Between 85 and 90 per cent of Iran's bulk imports normally land at Bandar Abbas and Imam Khomeini, both inside the Strait of Hormuz.[18] FAO estimated in March 2026 that 20 to 45 per cent of key food and farm inputs depend on passage through Hormuz.[29] Yemen's Red Sea ports and Jordan's only port at Aqaba lie on the approach to Bab el-Mandeb, and no fuel at all reached Yemen's Red Sea ports in March 2026.[4]
Outside Iran and Iraq, reliance on imports is severe: about 90 per cent of Israel's grain,[6] roughly 85 per cent of Yemen's food[13] and about 80 per cent of Lebanon's.[15]
Unlike the Gulf states, several countries can use land routes. While the strait was closed, grain moved overland from Russia into Iran and from Turkey and Syria into Iraq,[21] and the Jordan-Syria border reopened to all goods in 2026.[7] But sanctions still limit Iran's payments, insurance and choice of suppliers.
Upstream dependence:
Feed is the region's biggest weak point, and almost all of it is imported.
Iran is forecast to import 11 million tonnes of maize and 2 to 3 million tonnes of soybeans in 2026/27, against total feed demand of about 21 million tonnes.[1, 18, 19] Its livestock farms held 14 to 21 days of feed in early 2026, falling to 14 days by mid-March.[18] Israel grows no maize and imports 1.45 million tonnes, and gets about 80 per cent of its distillers' grains and maize gluten feed from the United States.[6] Jordan imports 900,000 tonnes of barley and 750,000 tonnes of maize, and grows 25,000 tonnes of barley.[7]
The region does make fertiliser. Iran is one of the Gulf's largest urea exporters, and Israel exports phosphate fertiliser.[20, 22] Iran and Iraq produce their own energy for pumps, mills and cold stores.
But that fertiliser could not reach markets in 2026. About 35 per cent of world urea exports normally pass through Hormuz.[20] Only five fertiliser ships had left the Gulf since 28 February 2026,[21] and world urea prices rose about 26 per cent to USD 585 a tonne by March.[20] Iran's own farmers still face a fertiliser shortfall,[18] and Iran also imports young fish for its fish farms because it lacks hatcheries.[26]
Access and affordability:
In 2024, the share ranged from 2.3 per cent in Jordan to 73.5 per cent in Syria. It was 14.3 per cent in Palestine, 22.7 in Israel, 27.1 in Iraq, 35.7 in Iran and 45.6 in Lebanon. Across the seven members with figures, 35.5 per cent could not afford one. Yemen, with 17.2 per cent of the region's people, has no figure.[35] Lebanon's rate rose from 0.1 per cent in 2019 as the cost of a healthy diet climbed from Int$1.88 to Int$6.45 per person per day.[35]
In Syria, averaged 40.8 per cent in 2023–25 and was 23.5 per cent.[35, 36] In Israel, undernourishment was below 2.5 per cent and food inflation 1.6 per cent.[35, 36, 39] Jordan's figures do not fit together easily: only 2.3 per cent cannot afford a healthy diet, yet 12.2 per cent are undernourished.[35, 36]
Prices swing wildly. Food inflation reached 105 per cent in Iran in February 2026,[37] 22 per cent in Syria in April[42] and 483 per cent in Lebanon in January 2022,[41] against 0.37 per cent in Jordan[40] and 2.50 per cent in Iraq.[38] In Gaza, three-quarters of former cropland is damaged or destroyed, and 77 per cent of people faced crisis-level hunger or worse in December 2025.[17, 30]
World prices explain little of this. Local currencies, fuel costs and fighting drive most of the swings.[49, 50] From March 2022 to March 2026, Iran's food prices rose 462.5 per cent and Lebanon's 892.3 per cent, while the FAO Food Price Index fell 19.7 per cent. In Palestine, food prices varied by 222.7 per cent within 2025, as the Gaza blockade was imposed and lifted.[50, 51]
Jordan's currency peg and subsidies kept staple prices steady. Pita bread cost JOD 0.320 a kilogram from 2021 to July 2026, and food prices rose just 5.5 per cent in the four years to March 2026.[50, 52, 54] Iraq's subsidised food rations and its February 2023 currency revaluation brought wheat flour prices 4.7 per cent below their 2022 average by 2025.[52, 54] Israeli egg prices rose 2.2 per cent during 2025.[52]
Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Palestine felt only part of the 2021–22 world price spike. Jordanian chicken prices rose by about two-fifths as much as world meat prices.[50, 51, 52] At July 2026 prices, a day's pay at Jordan's JOD 290 monthly minimum wage bought 4.5 kilograms of chicken. In four members, minimum wages say little about what households actually earn.[52, 55]
Shock endurance:
Food stocks and access to money vary sharply, and most governments have far less to spend than the Gulf states.
Jordan and Iraq hold large grain reserves. In March 2026 Jordan reported about ten months of wheat and seven and a half of barley, with 2.31 million tonnes of storage that could hold more than sixteen months if full. Bread prices are frozen until December 2026.[7] Iraq's reserves were put at about 14.5 months, backing a ration system that delivers subsidised flour nationwide.[28] In February 2026, flour and rice prices there were 6 and 8 per cent lower than a year earlier.[2]
Israel relies on buying food rather than storing it. Its wheat stocks of about 366,000 tonnes cover less than two months.[6] But with GDP per head of USD 60,337[11] and a working private import trade, supply has held, and poultry and eggs met demand throughout the war.[6]
Beyond these three there is very little. Iran holds 7 to 8 million tonnes of grain against wheat use of 1.4 million tonnes a month.[18] That is about five months of bread but only three weeks of feed for its livestock. Retail wheat flour cost about 170 per cent more in January 2026 than a year earlier.[1] Households, not the state, are bearing the shock.
Money to pay for imports follows the same divide. Israel holds 15.8 and can borrow freely, with an A rating from S&P and Baa1 from Moody's. Iraq holds 11.2 months, backed by oil revenue. Jordan holds 7.8 months, with BB- and Ba3 ratings.[43, 44, 45] Lebanon holds 13.6 months, but it defaulted on its debt in 2020 and has been shut out of borrowing ever since.[43, 46] Palestine holds 1.9 months, has no currency of its own, and relies on tax revenue collected and passed on by Israel.[43]
For about a quarter of the region's protein consumption, people depend on humanitarian aid, and that aid is being withdrawn. WFP support in Houthi-controlled Yemen has been paused since September 2025, affecting 9.5 million people.[13] About 12 million Syrians have no planned assistance, and where rations are delivered they cover 32 per cent of minimum calories.[14] On the other side, Iran's food system has lasted through four decades of sanctions, and Israel kept supply running through war. Regional protein supply of 73.2 grams per person per day is about a quarter above what people need.
Trajectory
Managing water better is the main change within the region's control. Iraq has halved river-irrigated wheat and made drip and sprinkler irrigation compulsory,[28] and Syria has a 2026–30 farm strategy, though neither is funded at the scale of the problem.[34] Iran could save a lot of water: farming takes 92 per cent of what is drawn, with only a third reaching crops, but its push for self-sufficiency makes change harder.[25] Food reserves are also growing. Jordan's expanded Qatraneh storage, Israel's Haifa grain terminal and new law on reporting stocks, and Iraq's reserve all buy time if shipping is disrupted, but none reduces the region's reliance on imports.[7]
Everything else depends on the war. While Hormuz is closed, Iran's food imports arrive only in small amounts through Chabahar,[21] and the fertiliser shortage points to a weaker 2027 harvest whatever the rainfall.[18] Reopening the strait would restore Iran's food imports and urea exports at once. It would do little for Yemen, Syria or Gaza, where conflict and damaged infrastructure hold back supply.
There are some improvements. Syria's pound has strengthened,[14] Iraq's stored water recovered from under 4 billion to about 34 billion cubic metres over the 2025/26 wet winter,[33] and Yemen's rial rose 55 per cent.[4] But they come alongside a fertiliser shortfall for the 2027 crop and a shrinking aid budget.
Country notes
Iran. The region's largest farm sector and its most exposed supply routes: 19.5 million tonnes of cereals in 2025,[1] 85 to 90 per cent of bulk imports through ports inside Hormuz, 14 to 21 days of feed,[18] wheat flour prices up 170 per cent,[1] and large urea exports it cannot currently ship.[22]
Iraq. The government reported cereal self-sufficiency for a fourth year, on a 5 million tonne crop; FAO estimated 4.4 million tonnes.[27, 2] Grain reserves cover about 14.5 months, but water remains a constraint.[28]
Yemen. About 400,000 tonnes of cereals against a need of 5.2 million,[4] and 85 per cent of food imported.[13] 5.0 million people, 47 per cent, faced crisis-level hunger or worse in March to May 2026,[12] and it has the region's lowest water and protein supply.[9, 8]
Syria. Farming has collapsed: cereals were 1.2 million tonnes in 2025, more than 60 per cent below average, against 3 million tonnes of forecast wheat imports and a severe shortage of foreign currency.[3] Twelve million people have no planned assistance, while a strengthening pound is the first improvement in over a decade.[14]
Israel. The richest member, at USD 60,337 a head,[11] and among the most reliant on imports anywhere: 90 per cent of grain imported, 70 to 80 per cent of wheat from Russia alone, and no maize grown against 1.45 million tonnes imported.[6] Against that, it produces 99 per cent of its poultry[23] and kept supply going through the war on less than two months of wheat stocks.[6]
Jordan. Grows almost nothing but holds large reserves: ten months of wheat, seven and a half of barley and 2.31 million tonnes of storage,[7] on 61 cubic metres of renewable water per person.[9] Its weak points are a single port at Aqaba and the risk of attack on the reserve itself; a cyberattack on its silo system was stopped on 3 March 2026.[7]
Lebanon. The least prepared importer: 90,000 tonnes of cereals in 2025, half the five-year average,[5] about 80 per cent of food imported, and Beirut's silos, destroyed in 2020, never replaced, so wheat arrives just in time with no buffer.[15] About 874,000 people faced crisis-level hunger or worse over the 2025/26 winter.[31]
Palestine. In Gaza, the December 2025 food security analysis put 1.6 million people, 77 per cent of the population, in crisis-level hunger or worse; famine was no longer declared after the October ceasefire.[17] About 75 per cent of former cropland is destroyed or damaged,[30] and Palestine has the region's least arable land per person.[10]