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Southern Africa (excl. South Africa)

PSI score 44.1/100DependentRank 34 of 43

Covers: Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Eswatini, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros

Summary

Southern Africa produces most of its protein locally, but supply per person is low and drought can sharply cut harvests. The regional average is only 51.2 grams of protein available per person per day, including 13.9 grams from animal foods.⁠[1, 2] Maize, roots and tubers, livestock and fish sustain very different local diets. Those foods provide a degree of independence from imports, yet they leave little surplus to draw on when harvests fail.⁠[1, 2, 3]

That weakness was visible during the 2024 El Niño drought. Zambia's maize harvest was halved, and six countries declared emergencies.⁠[3, 16, 46] Buying food abroad can help cover a failed crop, but household income is another limit: available country estimates suggest that around four in five people cannot afford a healthy diet.⁠[52] A system that meets most of its own needs in an ordinary year has little spare capacity for a bad one.

The protein system

Protein supply averages only 51.2 grams per person per day, 13.9 grams of it from animal foods.⁠[1] Even so, the region produces about 92 per cent of the protein it uses, mainly from maize, roots and tubers, grazing livestock and fish.⁠[1, 2, 3] Farming uses few bought-in inputs, which leaves little room to make up for a poor harvest quickly.

The system is cheap to run but thin in nutrition. Only 555,000 of 4,475,000 tonnes of protein went to animal feed in 2023, 12.4 per cent, because most protein is eaten directly rather than fed to animals first.⁠[1] Animal protein makes up 27 per cent of the total, and it varies hugely between members: 5.0 grams a day in Madagascar against 56.4 in Seychelles.⁠[1] Trade is small overall. Imports equal 19.6 per cent of protein supply, or 9.1 per cent after exports.⁠[1] South Africa supplied about 36 per cent of the region's USD 10.82 billion food import bill.⁠[4]

Durable domestic capacity:

The region looks more self-sufficient than it is. FAO figures put protein self-sufficiency at 91.9 per cent in 2023, up from 89.3 per cent in 2022.⁠[1] That average also hides how little people eat: protein supply is 51.2 grams a day, below the 58 grams people need.⁠[1]

Harvests are also unstable. Regional maize output fell 17.9 per cent to 11.28 million tonnes in 2024. Zambia's fell 54 per cent, Namibia's 59, Lesotho's 56, Botswana's 45 and Zimbabwe's 38.⁠[3] averages 26.7 per cent across the eleven members with figures, from 4.9 per cent in Mauritius to 41.8 per cent in Madagascar.⁠[2] Investment has worked where it was made. Zambian fish farming grew from 10,530 tonnes in 2011 to 76,627 in 2023, and Zimbabwe's irrigated wheat reached 639,942 tonnes in 2025.⁠[24, 29] Both are exceptions, and lake fisheries are being fished down: Lake Malawi's chambo stocks have fallen sharply.⁠[27]

Resource headroom:

The region has 29.6 million hectares of arable land and 216.4 million hectares of pasture, or 1.27 hectares of grazing per person.⁠[6] Most members have plenty of water: the share drawn off is 0.3 per cent in Namibia, 1.8 per cent in Angola and Mozambique and 8.6 per cent in Zambia, against 67.6 per cent in South Africa.⁠[7] Farmers apply an average of 25.5 kilograms of fertiliser per hectare, against a world average of 117, and only 2.0 in Comoros, so there is plenty of room to raise yields.⁠[5, 8]

But population growth has cut the land available per person, and irrigation has not kept up. From 2000 to 2024, arable land per person fell 30.9 per cent, and the share of land equipped for irrigation slipped from 6.47 to 5.76 per cent.⁠[6] Only 1.71 million hectares are equipped today. Weak farm lending and stalled development schemes limit what more can be farmed.⁠[58, 59, 60, 61]

Two flagship schemes show the problem. Mozambique's ProSAVANA aimed to develop 11 to 14 million hectares of the Nacala corridor before it was cancelled in 2020. Zambia's Farm Block programme has run for two decades without finding an anchor investor for its 110,000-hectare Nansanga block, and spent only 14.7 per cent of its funds between 2022 and 2024.⁠[59, 60, 61] The sea has reached its limits too. Namibia's hake stock is well below a sustainable level, its 2026 quota is 133,000 tonnes, and the horse mackerel quota was cut 5 per cent to 197,000 tonnes.⁠[25, 48] Indian Ocean tuna, vital to the islands, is in better shape, with only bigeye overfished.⁠[26]

Import exposure:

The region imports little, but its main imports come from neighbours, above all South Africa. Zambia is a net cereal exporter and Malawi imports 1.9 per cent of its cereals. But Lesotho buys all its maize from one supplier, Botswana 99.9 per cent, Namibia and Eswatini 99.8 per cent, Mozambique 98.3 per cent and Zimbabwe 97.4 per cent.⁠[2, 4] South Africa supplies 73.2 per cent of the region's dairy imports. Wheat comes from a wider range of countries.⁠[4]

South Africa is a weaker backstop in drought, because the same weather hits it too. Its 2023/24 crop fell 22 per cent to 12.85 million tonnes in the drought that hit its neighbours, yet Zimbabwe still took 57 per cent of South African maize exports, about 1.3 million of 2.2 million tonnes to April 2025.⁠[16] The region mostly eats white maize, which only South Africa and Tanzania supply in bulk.⁠[14, 17] Foot-and-mouth outbreaks in 2025-26 also disrupted livestock trade between members.⁠[32]

Sea chokepoints pose little risk. Landlocked members depend instead on the ports of Durban, Beira, Nacala, Walvis Bay and Dar es Salaam,⁠[39] while the islands import 78 to 100 per cent of their cereals.⁠[1, 2]

Upstream dependence:

The region imports most of its farm inputs, but uses so little that the risk is moderate. It used 803,029 tonnes of fertiliser nutrients in 2023 and produced just 48,900 tonnes, or 6.1 per cent, importing 984,285 tonnes. The only domestic nitrogen was Zimbabwe's 5,500 tonnes.⁠[5] Every member except Angola imports more fuel than it exports, poultry and dairy breeding stock is imported, and fertiliser subsidies are the largest public farm spending in Malawi and Zambia, at several per cent of GDP a year.⁠[38]

The shares look worse than the real exposure. Farmers apply 25 kilograms of fertiliser per hectare, against a world average of 117, and under 10 in Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, Lesotho and Comoros. A price shock therefore lowers yields rather than stopping production.⁠[5, 8] That is what happened in 2022-23: Angola's nitrogen use fell 41 per cent and phosphate 68 per cent without output collapsing.⁠[5] Some feed is grown in the region. Members grew 1.17 million tonnes of soybeans in 2023, and Zambia expects about 300,000 tonnes of soybean meal from its 2025/26 crop.⁠[3, 4, 36] But few crushers compete in Zambia and Malawi, which keeps feed costs high.⁠[37] Foot-and-mouth vaccine is made in the region, though not in the quantity needed.⁠[34] Labour is plentiful: farming employs 73.0 per cent of workers in Mozambique.⁠[11] Energy is the main remaining risk, because hydropower depends on the same rain as crops. Usable storage at Kariba dam fell to 13 per cent in 2024, causing long power cuts in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's power company set aside 150 MW to irrigate winter wheat.⁠[30, 31, 49]

Access and affordability:

About 82 per cent of people in the region , from 15.2 per cent in Mauritius to 93.6 per cent in Madagascar, against a world figure of 31.9 per cent.⁠[52] Undernourishment averaged 26.7 per cent, more than three times the world average.⁠[2] averaged 36.2 per cent, and Angola's 2024 estimate was 47.7 per cent.⁠[53] Food prices rose 18.5 per cent across the region in 2025. Zimbabwe's rose 42.2 per cent that year, then fell to 0.7 per cent a year later in early 2026. Malawi's inflation stayed near 21 per cent.⁠[54]

The main problem is the cost of food. Physical access is worst in a few places. In Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, 474,410 people were still displaced in February 2026. In Madagascar, after the October 2025 military takeover, 1.57 million people faced acute food insecurity, projected to rise to 1.8 million, with the worst conditions in the Grand Sud.⁠[50, 42, 43, 44]

Growing your own food does not guarantee a good diet. Malawi produces 102.5 per cent of the protein it uses,⁠[1] yet 91.5 per cent of its people cannot afford a healthy diet and 58.1 per cent are severely food insecure.⁠[2, 52]

Across much of the region, transport costs keep maize prices apart from world prices, except after unusually good or bad harvests. Malawi's maize price more than doubled in late 2008 and early 2009, as the lean season added to the world price spike.⁠[64, 65] The same happened in 2025. Zambia's average retail maize price in February was 105.0 per cent above its August low, and Malawi's was 67.1 per cent above its May low, far more than world prices moved that year.⁠[66, 67] A staple that doubles in price between harvest and lean season hurts household budgets more than any likely world price spike, and it happens every year.

Currency falls explain most of the rest. Zambia's retail egg price rose 33.2 per cent between 2021 and 2024, while world meat prices in kwacha rose 42.6 per cent. Almost all of that rise came from the weaker kwacha rather than from world prices in dollars.⁠[66, 67, 68] Prices did not come down when world prices did. The regional food price index rose 152.6 per cent between March 2022 and March 2026, while the FAO index fell 19.7 per cent. Leaving out Zimbabwe, where prices rose 824.5 per cent, the rise was 82.2 per cent.⁠[54, 55, 66] In working hours the cost is high. A kilogram of mixed meat in Zambia cost ZMW 106.53 in August 2026, or 14.2 hours at the unskilled minimum wage of ZMW 1,300 a month. A kilogram of maize in Malawi cost 1.7 hours at its minimum wage.⁠[67, 69] Minimum wages cover only formal jobs, and most rural households live from farming, so the burden on them is likely heavier.

Shock endurance:

The 2024 El Niño showed how little the region holds in reserve. Drought halved Zambia's maize crop, affected more than 30 million people and led six countries to declare emergencies.⁠[13, 46] Protein supply averages 51.2 grams per person per day, below the 58 grams people need, so there is no margin to lose.⁠[1] is also thin, from about two weeks in Zimbabwe to 3.44 months in Mozambique.⁠[9]

Households grow or raise several foods besides maize. Farming employs 52 to 73 per cent of workers in the six largest members, and pulses, small livestock, sorghum and millet can stand in when maize is short. Cassava adds calories but little protein.⁠[3, 11] Harvests also bounced back. Zambian maize went from 1.51 million tonnes in 2024 to a forecast 4,937,605 tonnes in 2025/26, and Zimbabwe's government expects to hold a reserve of over 900,000 tonnes from the same season.⁠[18, 20, 47] Neither makes up for weak public finances, and the main source of outside help has shrunk. The World Food Programme closed its Southern Africa office, now run from Nairobi, after about 90 per cent of USAID contracts were cancelled.⁠[15]

The region has little money to pay for imports in a crisis. Government debt is 102.5 per cent of GDP in Mozambique and 86 per cent in Zambia even after its 2024 bond restructuring. Zimbabwe's debt looks low only because unpaid arrears shut it out of international markets, and Comoros's reflects its reliance on aid.⁠[57]

Trajectory

Reserves are being rebuilt after two good harvests. Zambia's Food Reserve Agency is buying at least 500,000 tonnes of maize for 2026/27, Zimbabwe has 500,000 tonnes of strategic storage and aims for 1.5 million, and Malawi's National Food Reserve Agency has 180,000 tonnes of silos.⁠[19, 21, 22] But Malawi's agency was still waiting for money in June 2026 for a planned 108,000-tonne purchase. The storage exists; the funding does not.⁠[23]

A new El Niño is building. FEWS NET expects it to strengthen into the 2026/27 season, with crisis-level hunger projected for southern Angola, southern and central Malawi, southern Mozambique and Madagascar's Grand Sud in the October 2026 to January 2027 lean season, and pockets of emergency among Angolan farmers who have lost their livestock.⁠[12] NOAA had an El Niño advisory in force in June 2026,⁠[51] reversing the good outlook issued for 2025/26.⁠[45] Foot-and-mouth disease is also disrupting livestock trade within the region and, for Botswana, access to the EU market.⁠[32, 33]

Irrigation would help most. Only 5.8 per cent of arable land is equipped, a share that has fallen since 2000, and that is why a poor rainy season becomes a national disaster.⁠[6] Raising fertiliser use to half the world average would lift output without new land.⁠[5, 8] Both need credit.⁠[58] Zambia's Farm Block programme and Mozambique's ProSAVANA show that setting land aside is not the same as financing it.⁠[59, 60] Zimbabwe's move to title deeds that can be used as loan security, begun in 2025, will test whether land reform can unlock that credit.⁠[62, 63] Buying white maize from more countries than South Africa, and funding a regional reserve, would reduce the risk of all members being hit by the same drought. None of this changes the fact that 82.3 per cent of the region's people cannot afford a healthy diet. Higher output will help only if it raises incomes and lowers food prices.

Country notes

Angola. Oil pays for a wide range of food imports, but low fertiliser use, poor nutrition and a severe food-security outlook hold back home production.⁠[3, 4, 5, 12]

Zambia. Strong fish farming,⁠[28] credit⁠[58] and a quick harvest recovery⁠[47] sit beside severe undernourishment,⁠[2] sharp swings in maize prices⁠[67] and slow progress on the Farm Blocks.⁠[1, 60]

Malawi. Nearly self-sufficient in cereals and protein, yet food insecurity is severe, incomes are low and import cover is thin.⁠[1, 2, 6, 9]

Mozambique. The region's largest arable area⁠[6] and key ports,⁠[39] but poor nutrition,⁠[2] weak farm lending,⁠[58] displacement⁠[41, 50] and low incomes.⁠[10] The restarted LNG project will bring income in the long term, not food now.⁠[40]

Zimbabwe. Irrigated wheat⁠[24] and relatively high animal-protein supply,⁠[1] against two weeks of import cover,⁠[9] isolation from lenders⁠[57] and doubts over whether the new land titles can secure loans.⁠[62, 63]

Botswana. Produces little of its own protein beyond beef and buys most food from one neighbour; foot-and-mouth disease has restricted its access to the EU.⁠[1, 2, 4, 33]

Namibia. Fish and beef exports make it a protein exporter, but it imports almost all its grain and its maize harvests are vulnerable to drought.⁠[1, 3, 35]

Lesotho. Closely tied to South Africa, which supplies all its maize and most of its food imports; food imports take 43 per cent of export earnings.⁠[3, 4]

Eswatini. The region's highest water stress and its largest irrigated share; protein self-sufficiency is falling and it relies on South African grain.⁠[1, 6, 7]

Madagascar. Grows most of its own rice,⁠[1] but has the region's worst nutrition,⁠[2] acute food insecurity⁠[43, 44] and instability after the 2025 takeover.⁠[42]

Mauritius. Imports much of its food, but has the region's best nutrition and highest incomes; tuna processing is its main protein industry.⁠[1, 2, 10, 26]

Seychelles. Tuna landed and re-exported inflates both its self-sufficiency and its import figures; food security rests on fisheries management and import cover.⁠[1, 9, 26]

Comoros. Money from abroad and aid pay for food imports worth more than twice its merchandise exports; small-scale fishing and pulses supply local protein.⁠[1, 2, 6]

Sources (70)
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Data gaps

Zimbabwe's unaffordability reading is stuck at 2017 (75.5 per cent), predating the country's 2025-26 currency stabilisation, so its current position could sit well above or below that figure. Undernourishment and food-security estimates cover only eleven to thirteen members, since Lesotho, Seychelles and Mozambique lack the relevant national series. Angola's 2024 child stunting estimate (47.7 per cent) has a wide margin of error because no recent nationally representative survey underlies it. No member discloses an audited strategic grain reserve, and the regional SADC food reserve facility shows no evidence of being funded or operational. Official irrigation figures for sub-Saharan Africa miss much of the irrigation that farmers build and run themselves, so the irrigated share shown is probably too low.⁠[70]

About this assessment

2026 edition.

Written by Felix Collins and Alex Aldridge. Published by Full Circle Biotech.

Methodology reviewed by an independent expert panel.