The Protein Sovereignty Index

Country assessment

Thailand

We assess Thailand as Exposed (64.7). It belongs to the small group of countries that produce more animal protein than they consume, with an animal-protein self-sufficiency ratio we compute at 120.9 per cent for 2023,[1] chicken exports of 1.275 million tonnes forecast for 2026[4] and rice exports of 7.5 million tonnes.[3]

What actually binds sits upstream of all of it: Thailand grew 51,000 tonnes of soybeans against 4.25 million tonnes of imports,[5] manufactures no nitrogen fertiliser, and drew 49.0 per cent of its 3.17 million tonnes of nitrogen fertiliser imports from producers loading inside the Strait of Hormuz and 61.8 per cent from the Gulf region as a whole,[7] a route through which outbound fertiliser shipments stood at close to zero from early March to June 2026.[29]

Resource headroom looks generous on a single-year stock reading but is thinner in practice: arable land per person has fallen 21.2 per cent since 2000[46][51] and irrigation investment has not grown in fourteen years.[46] Access and affordability sit at 72: national food insecurity and undernourishment are contained, while child stunting runs to 20 per cent in the conflict-affected southern provinces against a 13 per cent national rate.[37]

The protein system

Thailand feeds 71.7 million people 68.63 grams of protein per person per day, of which 27.18 grams comes from animal sources, a 39.6 per cent animal share.[1] Rice supplies 23.26 grams, fish and seafood 9.62 grams, meat 10.16 grams split almost evenly between pigmeat and poultry, and eggs 3.68 grams.[1] Undernourishment stands at 4.6 per cent and child stunting at 12.4 per cent, both low for the region.[2]

Production exceeds consumption. From FAO Food Balance Sheets we compute a total dietary protein self-sufficiency ratio of 80.5 per cent for 2023, rising to 106.4 per cent once imported soybeans destined for the crush are removed from domestic supply, alongside the animal-protein ratio of 120.9 per cent.[1] Thailand is the sixth largest chicken producer among individual countries at a forecast 3.575 million tonnes in 2026 and the fourth largest exporter among them at 8.6 per cent of world trade, ranking seventh and fifth in USDA's table, which counts the European Union as one unit.[4] It is the third largest rice exporter, milling 20.3 million tonnes against domestic consumption of 12.8 million.[3] In 2024 it landed 1.65 million tonnes of wild-caught aquatic animals and farmed 1.00 million tonnes more.[2] Agricultural exports over January to October 2024 reached THB 1.54 trillion against THB 610 billion of imports.[21]

That system runs on imported inputs. Compound feed demand is projected at 22.05 million tonnes for 2026, of which soybean meal at about 5 million tonnes is 24 per cent and maize 43 per cent; Thailand imported 3.0 million tonnes of soybean meal in MY2025/26 and crushed 2.34 million tonnes more out of imported beans, so essentially the entire protein fraction of the national feed ration originates abroad.[5] Fertiliser is bought in its entirety, 6.23 million tonnes in 2024 on our computation from Thai customs returns,[7] against an industry statement that import reliance is 100 per cent.[9] Energy is the third leg, with 58 per cent of crude oil and 24 per cent of liquefied natural gas arriving through Hormuz.[12]

Durable domestic capacity: 73

Quantitative score 77, adjusted down 4 points

Thailand's production base is among the strongest in Asia on volume and among the more fragile on durability. Marine capture was fished beyond the regulator's own reference point for decades up to 2014. Catch per unit effort has fallen from about 295 kilogrammes per hour in 1963 to under 20, and more than 40 per cent of the marine catch is low-value or juvenile fish.[16] Indo-Pacific mackerel landings collapsed from over 160,000 tonnes in 1999 to 27,000 in 2020, and Thailand now buys in roughly 200,000 tonnes of mackerel a year.[17] The Department of Fisheries works to a maximum sustainable yield reference of 1.5 million tonnes; catches ran 32.8 per cent above it before the European Union's 2015 illegal-fishing yellow card, and the commercial fleet was cut from over 13,000 vessels to about 10,000 by 2021 in response.[17]

Shrimp repeats the pattern in a farmed sector. Official vannamei output was 232,807 tonnes in 2025 against a 2011 peak near 600,000, thirteen years after acute hepatopancreatic necrosis disease halved the industry, with white spot and yellow head virus outbreaks recorded again in 2025.[14][15] We deduct 4 points because nominal capacity overstates what these two bases can sustain.

Resource headroom: 47

Quantitative score 53, adjusted down 6 points

By Asian standards Thailand has genuine room, though a single-year stock reading overstates how much of it is moving. Arable land is 0.221 hectares per person against Vietnam's 0.067, agricultural land covers 43.8 per cent of the territory, renewable internal freshwater is 3,130 cubic metres per person per year, and withdrawals are 23.0 per cent of internal renewable resources, so the country is unstressed on an annual water accounting.[2] It also holds a feed-energy base that is unusual among Southeast Asian protein exporters: 30.6 million tonnes of cassava, 10.9 million of it fed, and 5.0 million tonnes of maize.[1] Set against 2000, arable land has fallen 10.4 per cent in absolute terms, from 17.56 to 15.73 million hectares, and 21.2 per cent per person as population grew 13.7 per cent over the same period; cropland has held up better, up 2.9 per cent in absolute terms but still down 9.6 per cent per person.[46][51]

Water banking tells the same story. Land equipped for irrigation reached 6.415 million hectares in 2010 and has recorded no growth in the fourteen years since, well short of the 7.023 million hectare target the national irrigation programme set for itself around 1999.[46][52] The irrigated share of arable land has climbed from 31.8 to 40.8 per cent since 2000, but on a shrinking arable base rather than fresh investment.[46] Capital tells a more layered story again. FAOSTAT's commercial-bank credit series shows agriculture, forestry and fishing at just 0.51 per cent of national credit in 2024, an orientation index of 0.06 against parity of 1.00, a reading that in isolation looks like a capital vacuum.[47] It is not one: the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives carries a loan book of THB 1.66 trillion, eighteen times the FAOSTAT figure, reaching the great majority of Thai farm households through some 1,327 branches.[49] But that channel is heavily used rather than freely available. More than 90 per cent of Thai agricultural households already carry debt averaging THB 450,000, more than half with debt-to-income or debt-to-asset above 100 per cent, and Bank of Thailand-affiliated research finds household debt converging toward a steady state of 70 per cent of assets, a debt trap rather than uncommitted capacity to finance expansion.[48]

The constraint is composition and mobilisation capacity together. Around 25.5 per cent of the domestic cereal supply is fed to animals, fertiliser application runs at 287.3 kilogrammes of nutrient per hectare of arable land, and the protein mix leans on poultry, pork and shrimp, the three most feed-intensive systems Thailand operates.[1][2] The land that is genuinely expanding is moving into rubber and oil palm rather than food or feed crops, and the farm workforce that would need to do any further expansion is ageing: the share of Thai agricultural workers aged 65 and over rose from 4.5 to 16.7 per cent between 1980 and 2008, and workers aged 15 to 39 fell to 37.2 per cent of the total over the same span.[50] The same input-dependence pattern applies to the coastal sector: aquaculture takes almost 60 per cent of Thai aquafeed output at around 350,000 tonnes a year,[26] drawn from a marine ingredient base that has peaked. Fish meal is 4 per cent of the 2026 ration, about 880,000 tonnes,[5] against 465,657 tonnes of fish, meat and bone meals imported in 2024,[7] so much of it is already bought abroad and the domestic remainder comes from the trawl fishery described above.[16] Growth in farmed aquatic protein has to be bought rather than harvested. Taken together we deduct 6 points.

Import exposure: 73

Quantitative score 76, adjusted down 3 points

On protein for human consumption Thailand's direct exposure is low. Food was 14.7 per cent of merchandise exports against 6.6 per cent of merchandise imports in 2024,[2] and rice, chicken, pork, eggs and most fish are domestic. Where Thailand does import, the supplier base is generally wide: 4.03 million tonnes of wheat from Ukraine at 34.6 per cent, Australia and the United States at 15.0 each, then Bulgaria at 13.6, Canada at 6.6 and Brazil at 6.2, a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 0.193, and 466,000 tonnes of fish, meat and bone meals from 33 partners at an HHI of 0.140.[7] The wheat base is wide by construction and narrow by circumstance, since its largest single supplier is a country at war. Maize imports of 2.02 million tonnes came 86.5 per cent from Myanmar and 12.6 from Laos, concentrated yet overland and therefore indifferent to maritime chokepoints.[7] Dairy is the one dietary gap, at about 52 per cent protein self-sufficiency.[1]

The exception is the commodity the system cannot substitute. We compute an HHI of 0.839 for soybean meal and 0.773 for soybeans from Thailand's 2024 customs returns, with Brazil supplying 91.4 and 87.2 per cent respectively;[7] USDA's Bangkok post puts Brazil at 95 per cent of MY2024/25 soymeal imports independently,[5] and at 90 per cent of bean imports as far back as MY2023/24.[6] All of it moves by sea from the South Atlantic through the Malacca or Sunda straits, so geography compounds the concentration, and we deduct 3 points. Thai exposure also runs outward: food exports to the Middle East are forecast to fall 50.7 per cent across 2026, the steepest decline of any market, with canned tuna 17.4 per cent and rice 13.3 per cent dependent on it.[13]

Upstream dependence: 36

Quantitative score 32, adjusted up 4 points

Feed and fertiliser dependence is what caps Thailand's tier. Thailand manufactures no nitrogen fertiliser and has no operating potash mine, despite three concessions granted between 2015 and 2022 in Chaiyaphum, Udon Thani and Nakhon Ratchasima, all non-operational for want of finance.[22][23] Of the 3.17 million tonnes of nitrogen products imported in 2024, Saudi Arabia supplied 36.2 per cent, Qatar 10.0 and Bahrain 2.8, so 49.0 per cent came from producers that can only load inside the Strait of Hormuz; Oman adds a further 12.8 per cent from terminals at Sur and Sohar on the Gulf of Oman, taking the Gulf region as a whole to 61.8 per cent.[7] The WTO puts Thailand's Gulf share at close to half and records outbound fertiliser shipments through the strait collapsing to near zero from early March 2026.[29] Thailand had five fertiliser cargoes stranded behind the closure and was petitioning for their passage from 31 March;[10] flows only picked up after an interim settlement in June.[31] Domestic granular urea reached 17,000 baht per tonne ex-warehouse on 6 March 2026, up 800 baht in a single day, and retail 46-0-0 moved from about 800 baht to between 1,200 and 1,400 per 50-kilogramme bag against a fertiliser share of nearly 40 per cent of farm operating costs.[8][9] World urea rose from about USD 400 per tonne to above USD 850 in April 2026, then fell back to USD 453 by June once shipments resumed.[11][30][31]

Feed protein is the same dependence in a different commodity: 51,000 tonnes of domestic soybeans on 31,000 hectares against 4.25 million tonnes of imports, with transgenic cultivation still banned.[5] Feed wheat adds 3.5 million tonnes of imports and maize 1.0 to 1.8 million.[3] Breeding genetics for broilers and swine are imported, though we found no citable volumes.

Two mitigations earn a bounded uplift of 4 points. Part of the potash channel is structurally immune to maritime disruption, with Laos supplying 26.7 per cent of the 924,495 tonnes imported in 2024 overland from a neighbour, alongside Canada at 32.1 per cent.[7] That is qualified by Belarus at 17.3 per cent,[7] a channel carrying sanctions and shipping risk of its own. And the cut-off was absorbed rather than merely endured: stocks were drawn from 1.52 million tonnes in January 2026 to 1.116 million by 15 March, blends carrying 30 to 35 per cent urea were reformulated downwards, and negotiations opened with Malaysia, Brunei, Kazakhstan and Russia under a three-measure Ministry of Commerce programme.[10] How long that bought is disputed: Argus judged Thai urea covered to August on 6 March, the Trade Policy and Strategy Office said on 3 April that stocks would run to about April, and Bloomberg reported roughly one month of cover on 16 April.[8][10][33] Charoen Pokphand Foods gives Thailand a large domestic integrator, its feed business turning over THB 131.364 billion in 2024 across 11 countries, though CPF states that feed production is distributed within the country of production, so its overseas mills are no supply channel home.[18]

Access and affordability: 72

Quantitative score 72, no adjustment applied

FAO publishes no current affordability estimate for Thailand: the series is suppressed in every year from 2017 to 2025. The pillar rests instead on the measured evidence FAO does publish for Thailand. The nearest comparable outcome measure is the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity (FIES), which stood at 5.4 per cent in 2023, down from a pandemic-era peak of 7.1 per cent in 2021 and above the pre-pandemic reading of 4.7 per cent in 2018;[53] we use it in place of the discarded CoAHD share, in the same 40 per cent weight the rubric gives the unaffordability component. Undernourishment is low, at 4.6 per cent for 2023,[2] though child stunting is higher, at 12.4 per cent on the World Bank series and 13 per cent on the 2022 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,[2][37] placing Thailand in the World Health Organization's medium band rather than the low band its income level would suggest. Food price volatility has receded but not disappeared: the food and non-alcoholic beverages CPI ran 8.87 per cent above a year earlier in December 2022, led by prepared food at 9.66 per cent with pork, chicken, eggs and rice still elevated, in a year of 6.08 per cent average headline inflation, before easing to 1.53 per cent by December 2025, a year in which the headline index fell 0.14 per cent on average.[35][36]

The clearer weakness is distributional. The 2022 MICS survey found stunting at 20 per cent in the conflict-affected southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, against a 13 per cent national rate in the same survey, and 26 per cent in Ranong; wasting in Songkhla reached 26 per cent against 7 per cent nationally,[37] a geography that overlaps with Thailand's long-running separatist insurgency in the far south. A low national FIES reading and moderate undernourishment describe a population broadly food-secure in aggregate; a stunting rate above what Thailand's income level predicts, concentrated sharply in a conflict-affected region, describes a real and localised failure the national averages do not carry. We score 72: the FIES reading and low undernourishment position the pillar in the upper part of its range, held down by the weak stunting reading and the severity of the southern border gap. No adjustment; the indicators already carry the distributional weakness.

Shock endurance: 73

Quantitative score 68, adjusted up 5 points

Endurance rests on a retainable surplus rather than on a strategic reserve. Rice ending stocks of 3.847 million tonnes cover about 110 days of domestic consumption, and exports of 7.5 million tonnes equal 59 per cent of what Thais eat, so redirecting shipments inward is a very large and very fast buffer.[3] Dietary breadth is wide, with rice at 172.5 kilogrammes per person per year, milk at 31.9, fish and seafood at 28.6, meat at 24.5 and eggs at 11.7, all produced domestically at scale.[1]

The record of recovery is the strongest part of the case. After 1,050 avian influenza outbreaks across 60 of 76 provinces in 2004 and 2005 closed Thailand's frozen-poultry markets,[19] the industry restructured around processed product, which now accounts for 59 per cent of chicken export volume and gives Thailand the largest share of world processed-chicken trade at 26.3 per cent.[20] Thailand declared recovery of freedom from high pathogenicity avian influenza to the OIE in February 2009, has reported no outbreaks since 2008,[19] and is now taking Japanese market share from suppliers that have lost it to the disease.[5] African swine fever cut the recorded swine population to 10.84 million head in January 2022 and destroyed 43.35 per cent of pig farmers, from 188,590 to 106,495, yet swine production grew 9 per cent in 2025 with 6 per cent more forecast for 2026.[5][24] Thai Oil cut the Middle East share of its crude purchases to about 35 per cent from 91 within months, lifting African crude to 39 per cent of April and May 2026 buying.[25] Three shocks, three recoveries, and we add 5 points for demonstrated recovery from each.

Crisis purchasing power scores 83, lifting the blended score to 68. Foreign exchange reserves of USD 282.3 billion in 2025 provide 8.0 months of import cover,[2] and the Bank of Thailand's own gross reserves closed December 2025 at a record USD 301.9 billion, over nine months of cover, lifted by a gold holding of 244 tonnes in a year when gold rose about 70 per cent.[45] We score on the lower figure. Thailand also holds investment-grade sovereign ratings across all three major agencies: S&P and Fitch at BBB+ and Moody's at Baa1.[39][40][41] That rests on real strength, since Fitch cites net external assets of 47 per cent of GDP against a BBB-category median of minus 2 per cent, and interest costs of only 5.7 per cent of government revenue against a 9.2 per cent median,[39] but public debt is climbing towards Thailand's own self-imposed ceiling of 70 per cent of GDP, reaching 64.5 per cent at 31 July 2025 on the Public Debt Management Office's measure, with the IMF pressing Thailand to restore the 60 per cent ceiling it abandoned in 2021.[38][44] Both agencies moved to a negative outlook during 2025, Fitch in September on political and fiscal risks and Moody's in April on the tariff and growth shock, and Moody's returned to stable in April 2026.[39][41] Social protection has demonstrated real scale: the 2021 Rao Chana COVID-19 transfer programme reached 33.5 million people, close to half the population, through the Pao Tang digital-wallet rail,[42] though the 2024-25 sequel using the same rail reached only 18.55 million people before its youth phase, budgeted at THB 27 billion for 2.7 million recipients, was shelved in May 2025 for want of fiscal room.[43] The capacity to scale is real; the room to keep using it has narrowed.

The state is meanwhile buying time at fiscal cost: price controls on 59 categories of essential goods including compound feed and fertiliser, a 60-day price freeze from 17 March 2026, and a diesel subsidy at about 65 per cent of the selling price.[5] A Thai-Cambodian border conflict is costing more than THB 5 billion a month in exports, roughly 5 per cent of food export value.[13] A second stressor runs alongside it: China has suspended most Thai poultry establishments since 1 August 2025 on hygiene and standards grounds, cutting approved plants from 22 to 5, with an estimated THB 20 billion loss and China volumes falling from 100,000 tonnes towards 40,000 to 50,000 in 2026.[32] And the fertiliser shock reaches output with the harvests rather than with the price spike: FAO's chief economist reports growers from Punjab to the Mekong Delta already revising planting plans, with combined fertiliser, fuel and transport costs up 50 to 80 per cent.[11]

Trajectory

Three things would shift Thailand's position. The first is domestic fertiliser. Thailand sits on identified potash deposits of 17.3 million tonnes at Chaiyaphum, 23.7 million at Udon Thani and 2.2 million at Nakhon Ratchasima, with concessions granted in 2015, 2022 and 2015 respectively and none of the three mining for want of finance.[22] The Udon Thani project, approved by cabinet in June 2022 at THB 36 billion, was designed for about 2 million tonnes of potash a year,[23] which on its own would exceed the 924,495 tonnes Thailand imported in 2024.[7] Nitrogen is harder, since Thailand lacks the cheap gas that underwrites Gulf urea, though 2026 showed demand-side substitution has more room than the industry assumed.[10]

The second is feed protein diversification. Brazil at 91 per cent reflects policy as much as market: crude protein content rather than amino acid profile drives Thai buying preference, and tariff exemptions and quota certificates channel imports through eight approved trade associations.[5] Argentina, Paraguay and the United States are substitutable at the margin. Corn policy runs the other way, with a 3:1 domestic purchase requirement attached to the zero-duty quota that protects maize growers while raising the cost of the ration.[27]

The third is the resource base. Fleet reduction has brought marine catch back below the 1.5 million tonne reference, yet catch per unit effort has not recovered,[17] and the blackchin tilapia invasion has spread from Samut Songkhram, where it was first detected in 2011, to 13 coastal provinces as far south as Songkhla, with complete eradication judged unlikely.[28] The Thai Shrimp Association's 400,000 tonne target for 2026 would add about 148,000 tonnes over the 252,000 tonnes of vannamei and black tiger recorded in 2025.[14] On current policy, Thailand's position turns on whether production strength can keep offsetting its reliance on imported nitrogen and Brazilian meal.

Sources

  1. Food Balance Sheets, data (Asia), elements 645, 664, 671, 674, 5142, 5301, 5511, 5521, 5611, 5911 · FAOSTAT (2025 (data 2023))
  2. World Development Indicators: capture and aquaculture production, arable land, agricultural land, renewable internal freshwater, freshwater withdrawal, reserves and import cover, GDP per capita, undernourishment, stunting, food trade shares, fertiliser intensity · World Bank (FAO, AQUASTAT, IMF IFS and UNICEF/WHO source data) (2026 (data 2022-2025))
  3. Grain: World Markets and Trade, July 2026 · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2026)
  4. Livestock and Poultry: World Markets and Trade, April 2026 · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2026)
  5. Oilseeds and Products Annual, Bangkok, Thailand (TH2026-0008), 16 April 2026 · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2026)
  6. Oilseeds and Products Annual, Bangkok, Thailand (TH2025-0009) · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2025)
  7. Thailand reported imports for 2024, HS 1001, 1005, 1201, 2301, 2304, 3102, 3103, 3104 and 3105; supplier shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices computed by PSI on net weight · UN Comtrade (2024)
  8. Thailand's fertilizer supply ample as war continues · Argus Media (March 2026)
  9. Thai agriculture faces existential threat over fertiliser import trap · Nation Thailand (30 June 2026)
  10. Thailand launches 3 fertiliser measures over Hormuz crisis · Nation Thailand (3 April 2026)
  11. Middle East conflict sends fertiliser costs soaring for Asia's rice farmers · Nation Thailand (6 May 2026)
  12. Middle East tensions: implications for Thailand's economy and industries · Krungsri Research (Bank of Ayudhya) (16 March 2026)
  13. Middle East war hits Thai food exports in first two months of 2026 · Nation Thailand, reporting the Thai Chamber of Commerce (31 March 2026)
  14. Asian shrimp in 2025: steady supply and price volatility · Aqua Culture Asia Pacific, reporting Thai Department of Fisheries data (9 April 2026)
  15. Thailand's shrimp farming industry: navigating global market shifts · Aqua Culture Asia Pacific (8 May 2025)
  16. Thailand: status and trends of fisheries resources · Fisheries Refugia Initiative (UNEP/GEF, SEAFDEC-implemented) (accessed 2026)
  17. Thailand's contentious plan to curtail bottom trawling unfolds in slow motion · Mongabay, reporting Thai Department of Fisheries (September 2022)
  18. Annual Review 2024 (feed business revenue and country footprint) · Charoen Pokphand Foods PCL (2025 (data 2024))
  19. Self-declaration of freedom from highly pathogenic avian influenza in domestic poultry, Thailand · World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE/WOAH) (2009)
  20. Industry Outlook 2026-2028: Chilled, Frozen and Processed Chicken Industry (post-2004 restructuring to processed product; export composition and world shares) · Krungsri Research (Bank of Ayudhya) (31 October 2025)
  21. Thailand's agricultural exports surge to THB 1.54 trillion in January to October · Nation Thailand, reporting the Office of Agricultural Economics (12 December 2024)
  22. Potash mines still stalled as ministry awaits Thai fertiliser investors · Nation Thailand (14 March 2024)
  23. Cabinet okays THB 36bn potash mining project in Udon Thani · Nation Thailand (2022)
  24. Thai swine industry during the African swine fever outbreak in Asia · FFTC Agricultural Policy Platform, using Department of Livestock Development and Swine Raisers Association of Thailand data (2022)
  25. Thai Oil boosts crude imports from Africa, Americas to cut Mideast reliance · Bloomberg (11 May 2026)
  26. Aquafeed industry in Thailand: current status, sustainability and future trends (article authored by an industry supplier, Kemin Aqua Science; used only for the aquafeed volume split) · International Aquafeed (23 March 2025)
  27. Feed corn tariff cuts and extended AFTA import window take effect for 2026 · USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (July 2026)
  28. Sustainable ecosystem management strategies for tackling the invasion of blackchin tilapia in Thailand, Animals 14(22):3292 · MDPI, via PubMed Central (15 November 2024)
  29. Fertilizer trade impacted by Strait of Hormuz conflict (Gulf share of world nitrogenous exports; Thailand's Gulf share; standstill in outbound shipments; urea price path) · World Trade Organization Data Blog (10 July 2026)
  30. Fertilizer prices surge as Strait of Hormuz disruptions tighten supplies · World Bank (Prospects Group commodity analysis) (14 May 2026)
  31. Hormuz fertilizer flows recover significantly · Transport Topics, reporting Bloomberg and CRU Group (24 June 2026)
  32. Thai poultry exports face crisis over China ban and conflicts · Nation Thailand, reporting the Thai Broiler Processing Exporters Association (10 May 2026)
  33. Thailand rushes to secure oil and fertilizer as Hormuz remains shut · EnergyConnects, reporting Bloomberg and Kasikorn Research Center (16 April 2026)
  34. Share of the population that cannot afford a healthy diet, Thailand (FAO and World Bank, Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet database, reproduced with minor processing) · Our World in Data, using FAO/World Bank CoAHD data and Bai et al. (2024) methodology (2025 (data 2017-2024))
  35. Thailand's inflation rate in 2022 was close to its projection and expected to decelerate in 2023 (food and non-alcoholic beverages CPI +8.87% YoY in December 2022, prepared food +9.66%; headline +5.89% YoY in December and +6.08% annual average) · Trade Policy and Strategy Office, Ministry of Commerce (January 2023 (data December 2022 and full-year 2022))
  36. The Consumer Price Index for December 2025 (food and non-alcoholic beverages +1.53% YoY; annual average headline CPI -0.14% for 2025) · Trade Policy and Strategy Office, Ministry of Commerce (January 2026 (data 2025))
  37. Children in southern provinces lag in immunization, nutrition and learning (MICS 2022 provincial stunting and wasting data for Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, Ranong, Songkhla) · Nation Thailand, reporting the National Statistical Office and UNICEF (2023)
  38. Thailand: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report (public debt trajectory towards the 70% of GDP ceiling; growth slowdown) · International Monetary Fund (13 February 2026)
  39. Fitch revises Thailand's outlook to negative on political and fiscal risks while affirming 'BBB+' (net external assets 47% of GDP against a 'BBB' median of -2%; interest costs 5.7% of revenue against a 9.2% median; gross general government debt 59.4% of GDP in August 2025) · Kaohoon International, reporting Fitch Ratings (same action reported by Nation Thailand at https://www.nationthailand.com/business/economy/40055874) (24 September 2025)
  40. S&P affirms Thailand's 'BBB+' sovereign rating with stable outlook · Nation Thailand, reporting S&P Global Ratings (2025)
  41. Moody's Ratings upgrades Thailand's credit outlook to stable from negative, affirms Baa1 · Bloomberg, via Yahoo Finance (21 April 2026)
  42. Thailand extends the 7,000 baht 'Rao Chana' scheme to 33.5 million Thais · Thailand Business News (2021)
  43. Digital wallet cash handouts fail despite over 100 billion baht budget (Phase 1 14.55m recipients; Phase 2 4m elderly; Phase 3 for 2.7m young people aged 16-20, budgeted at THB 27 billion, shelved May 2025) · Nation Thailand (22 August 2025)
  44. IMF advises Thailand to reinstate 60% debt ceiling (public debt 64.49% of GDP at 31 July 2025 against the current 70% ceiling; IMF puts a ceiling with safety margin nearer 66%) · Nation Thailand, reporting the International Monetary Fund and the Public Debt Management Office (22 September 2025)
  45. Thailand's foreign reserves hit record high above US$300bn as baht strengthens and gold rallies (gross international reserves USD 301,919.17 million at end-December 2025; gold 244 tonnes, 7.3% of reserves) · Nation Thailand, reporting the Bank of Thailand (December 2025)
  46. Inputs: Land Use, data (Asia), items Arable Land (6621), Cropland (6620), Land area equipped for irrigation (6690) · FAOSTAT (2026 (data 1961-2024))
  47. Investment: Credit to Agriculture, data, item Credit to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (23068), agriculture orientation index, share of total credit and value · FAOSTAT (2026 (data 1991-2024))
  48. Financial Lives and the Vicious Cycle of Debt among Thai Agricultural Households, Discussion Paper No. 204 (more than 90% of agricultural households indebted, average THB 450,000, more than half with debt-to-income or debt-to-asset above 100%, debt converging to a steady state of 70% of assets) · Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research (Bank of Thailand) (31 March 2023)
  49. BAAC portfolio set to rise by B30bn this year (outstanding loans THB 1.66 trillion at end of FY2025/26, about 1,327 branches; primary article paywalled, figures corroborated across independent secondary reporting) · Bangkok Post (2026)
  50. Aspects of the Aging Farming Population and Food Security in Agriculture for Thailand and Japan, International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development 3(1) · Poungchompu, Kobayashi and Poungchompu, citing Thailand National Statistical Office 2011 (2012 (survey data 2003-2008, projections to 2028))
  51. World Development Indicators: population, total (Thailand) · World Bank (2026 (data 2000-2024))
  52. Thai National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage (THAICID) country profile, Thailand (national irrigation target of 5.0 to 7.023 million hectares within 15 years, circa 1999) · International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) (circa 1999-2000 (undated))
  53. Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity (FIES), Thailand · World Bank World Development Indicators (SN.ITK.MSFI.ZS), FAO Food Insecurity Experience Scale (2026 (data 2018-2023))

What we could not measure

FAO's current Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet release carries no confirmed estimate for Thailand from 2017 to 2025, so the affordability reading falls back on food-insecurity survey data (5.4 per cent, 2023) rather than a direct unaffordability figure. No official strategic rice or food reserve is disclosed, so stock cover is inferred from USDA estimates rather than a government programme. Thailand's aquaculture feed dependence on wild-caught fishmeal could not be pinned to a current data year, and no single figure exists for the imported share of animal-feed ingredients.

Published August 2026 ·How scores are produced