The protein system
Before Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine supplied 46 per cent of global sunflower seed, meal and oil exports and ranked among the leading grain exporters.[11] Its 32.7 million hectares of arable land include extensive chernozem soils.[10]
Production has fallen about 30 per cent from pre-war levels, with agricultural damage and losses estimated at USD 80–84 billion.[10, 13] Yet wheat output is estimated at 24.1 million tonnes against 8.8 million tonnes of domestic use, and maize at 30.9 million against 7.0 million.[3] Agri-food exports were 78.3 million tonnes worth USD 24.5 billion in 2024, equal to 59 per cent of all exports.[15]
Animal protein relies on domestic feed. Poultry production was about 1.41 million tonnes against consumption of 1 million in 2025; pork was near balance at 610,000 tonnes against 635,000, while fluid milk fell to about 7.1 million tonnes.[4, 5, 6] Fish is the main import dependence: the Azov fishery is lost under occupation, Black Sea catch is negligible, and more than 85 per cent of fish consumed is imported.[20, 21] The population fell from 44.3 million in 2021 to 37.9 million in 2024.[9]
Durable domestic capacity:
Ukraine produces far more grain and oilseeds than it consumes. Protein supply was 90.5 g per person daily in 2023, during the second year of the full-scale invasion; wheat self-sufficiency was about 270 per cent and maize above 400 per cent in MY2025/26.[3, 8] Poultry covers demand about 1.4 times over.[4]
The production base is being physically consumed. Up to 2.8 million hectares of farmland have been abandoned since February 2022.[14] About a fifth of grain storage capacity has been damaged or destroyed.[10] The June 2023 Kakhovka dam destruction removed irrigation for up to 800,000 hectares; more than 300,000 hectares now rely on rain, with productivity losses up to 70 per cent.[10] Occupation and frontline fighting continue to damage farms and processors.[5]
Resource headroom:
Ukraine retains fertile land and a rain-fed protein mix that uses relatively little feed grain. Poultry was 56.8 per cent of meat output by 2022, and most protein comes directly from crops.[10] Feed grain and meal remain abundant and domestically produced.[4]
Access to land and water is sharply constrained by war. About 4.5 million hectares of pre-war arable land are under Russian occupation; another 2 million hectares in government-controlled territory may be mined.[23, 34] Irrigated area fell from 424,000 hectares in 2021 to about 100,000 from 2022 onward. In Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, satellite tracking found irrigated land down from about 190,000 hectares before Kakhovka's destruction to 16,000 in 2024.[37, 38]
Labour shortages add to the constraint: 69.6 per cent of agricultural enterprises reported shortages in late 2024, while a quarter of rural households reduced or stopped production because of the war.[41] Credit has held up, with agriculture's share of bank credit rising from 11.0 to 15.4 per cent between 2021 and 2024; the 5-7-9 per cent programme financed 45 per cent of farm lending in 2025.[39, 40] Capital is available to work accessible land, but occupation, mines, irrigation loss and conscription restrict what can be used.
Import exposure:
Protein imports are limited: pork imports of about 30,000 tonnes cover under 5 per cent of consumption, and beef imports remain a premium niche.[5] Seafood is the exception. More than 85 per cent of fish is imported after the loss of Azov catch and militarisation of the Black Sea; suppliers are diversified and imports enter through EU territory.[20, 21, 22]
Ukraine's wartime chokepoint problem mainly affects exports. The Bosphorus and north-western Black Sea constrain what it can sell, while imports arrive across seven land borders with the EU and Moldova. An import interruption would first threaten farm income and dietary variety rather than basic protein adequacy.
Upstream dependence:
Domestic feed is abundant, but fertiliser production collapsed from 5.2 million tonnes in 2021 to 1.1 million in 2022 as only two of five plants remained operating. Output has partly recovered since: OSTCHEM produced 1.8 million tonnes in 2024, 13 per cent less than in 2023.[14, 16, 19] Urea imports are 84.7 per cent concentrated in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, while fertiliser use remains below pre-war levels.[17, 18]
Refined fuel is fully imported. Since 2022, Ukraine has replaced Belarusian and Russian rail-borne fuel with other suppliers; fuel and fertiliser corridors remain targets, and electricity shortages disrupt farms and processors.[4, 5, 11] Poultry and dairy genetics, veterinary inputs and much crop-protection chemistry are also imported, though national shares are unquantified.
Access and affordability:
War has sharply eroded purchasing power. At the World Bank's USD 6.85/day poverty line, poverty rose from 5.5 per cent in 2021 to 24.1 per cent in 2022.[26] On the World Bank's household phone survey, the Gini coefficient of inequality rose from 0.41 in 2023 to 0.50 in 2025.[27]
Nutrition outcomes are less severe than income measures suggest: reached 6.9 per cent in 2022–24, while was 11.7 per cent in 2024, down from 16.5 per cent in 2016.[25, 33] But war-driven grid attacks and logistics disruption made food inflation reach 23.2 per cent in June 2025; bread and flour prices rose about 40 per cent across 2024–25.[31, 32] In Q3 2025, 35.4 per cent of households reported reduced dietary diversity, rising to 41.4 per cent in targeted regions; frontline food insecurity was higher still, with over half of Kherson residents facing severe hunger.[27, 30]
During the 2021–22 spike, world poultry prices reached Ukrainian retail only partly: estimated was about 0.27 for chicken and 0.40 for eggs. The hryvnia fell 18.5 per cent against the dollar while four staple prices rose an average 23 per cent, implicating currency and domestic costs.[42, 43, 45] Prices continued rising after world prices fell: the four-item staple basket was up 55 per cent between March 2022 and July 2026, led by bread at 89.5 per cent.[42, 44] Eggs swung 128 per cent during 2024, reflecting a thin, war-disrupted supply chain.[42] A kilogram of chicken cost 2.13 hours of work at the statutory minimum wage, and 30 eggs cost 2.35 hours.[42, 46]
Shock endurance:
Ukraine has kept food moving through blockade and attack. In 2022, farmgate maize and wheat prices fell 45 per cent as production fell 30 per cent, shifting the immediate cost to farmers rather than creating consumer scarcity.[10] Wheat ending stocks were 2.13 million tonnes, about a quarter of annual domestic use.[3]
The country adapted export routes twice. EU Solidarity Lanes moved 93 million tonnes of agri-food products overland from May 2022, within 189 million tonnes of total goods.[12] After Russia left the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, Ukraine opened a coastal corridor under its own air defence; by June 2025, Black Sea ports carried 80 per cent of grain and oilseed exports, and export earnings had nearly returned to the pre-war record.[12, 15]
Reserves reached a record USD 57.3 billion at end-2025, covering 5.9 months of imports.[28] Public transfers reached 72 per cent of households with a displaced, veteran or disabled member, and WFP assisted around 1.5 million people monthly.[27, 30] Ukraine still relies on official finance: a four-year USD 8.1 billion IMF facility approved in February 2026, with USD 1.5 billion disbursed immediately, sits within a package addressing a USD 136.5 billion financing gap, including USD 52 billion in 2026.[29] Damage, lost storage, population decline, conscription and occupation continue to weaken the buffer.[9, 10, 13]
Trajectory
Ukraine's prospects depend on the war and on Europe. EU accession could anchor its food system in the single market and CAP, though transitional trade friction is already visible in quotas on Ukrainian wheat and barley.[1, 2, 10] USDA forecasts maize production of 31.5 million tonnes and exports of 26 million in 2026/27; barley exports are also expected to more than double, with added crush capacity drawing oilseeds into domestic processing.[2, 7]
Industrial-scale demining, restored southern irrigation, domestic nitrogen capacity and secure Black Sea shipping would strengthen the system.[10, 17, 24, 36] Demining is estimated to require USD 37 billion, or roughly 80 years at current rates without acceleration.[36] A ceasefire could return some occupied and mined land to production, though clearance and reconstruction would take time. Further territorial loss or a renewed blockade coinciding with drought would test whether surplus can withstand a shrinking base. Export revenues remain central to recovery, so safe maritime access will matter alongside ceasefire terms. Ukraine's resilience rests on keeping the system functioning under attack.